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FEATURE

ARTICLE

Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Legal Issues in Procreation
by Roger J. Chin, M.D.

Preface
This article examines the legal constraints on the denial of assisted reproductive services. The technical and policy background surrounding the provision of assisted reproductive technologies is surveyed. Unfortunately, individuals saddled with infertility face barriers to access on a number of levels:
from heath care providers, third-party payers, and the state. While efforts to
regulate natural procreation have been discredited by the failure of the eugenics movement, access to assisted reproductive technologies is often denied based
on judgments of parental fitness.
The constitutional protection of procreative rights and statutory guarantees of access to medical care must be weighed against state interests in
regulating these technologies. Because of the recent advent of these reproductive possibilities, legal precedents and regulations have failed to contemplate
the new conflicts that arise. However, an analysis of the values underlying the
legal doctrines and the jurisprudence in analogous situations reveals the scope
of the right to procreation. While new social and gestational combinations in
parenthood may be beyond the contemplation of due process protections, the
utilization of the new reproductive technologies in procreation is as much implicit in the concept of ordered liberty as judicial precedent has recognized
traditional coital reproduction to be. The state interest in the fetus or the future
family outcome is not sufficiently compelling to justify the denial of these
reproductive services.
Roger Chin was graduatedfrom Yale School of Medcine in
1996. Prior to receiving his J.D. from Yale Law School in
1995, Mr.Chin attended Cornell where he received his A.B.
in 1990. Currently,Mr. Chin is an associate with the law
firm of Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto,
California.Mr. Chin thanks Lisa Vincler,Esq. Assistant Attorney Generalfor the State of Washington; ProfessorAngela Holder,from Yale; and Stacey Gartland,Esq.
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Assisted reproductive technologies provide a new ability for many couples to overcome
infertility and to separate the reproductive process from sexual intercourse. When the use of
such procedures is seen as a couple's private decision to seek medical treatment or to decide to
raise a family, statutory and constitutional protections may attach. But state regulation of medical care creates a potential for interference in the
use of reproductive treatments, even where the
analogous traditional procreative decisions
would seem inviolable. Controversial goals of
fetal rights and family values are counterpoised
against concerns about discrimination and eugenics. In this field, clear legal rules are scant, but a
careful examination of statutory and constitutional concerns will help to prevent a haphazard
and inequitable transition into a new age of reproduction.
I. Technical background
There are a number of new medical techniques to promote fertility that require medical
intervention at various stages of reproduction.'
Artificial insemination is perhaps technologically
the most basic. It involves introduction of fresh
or frozen 2 semen into the vaginal cavity, mimicking the coital process. When the semen of the
husband is used, it is known as artificial insemination by husband ("AIH") 3 ; with a donor, it is
4
called artificial insemination by donor ("AID")
This process, everything else equal, offers a comparable success rates to coitus.
Taking the principle further, intrauterine
insemination is the placement of concentrated
sperm transcervically into the uterus. Drugs may
be administered to induce superovulation to improve chances of fertilization. This technique, in
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treatment of cervical factor infertility,5 is estimated to result in pregnancy in 48% of patients
and has a fecundity rate of 20%.6
Certain obstacles exist for sperm along
the path to the ovum. For example, when the fallopian tubes are occluded, various techniques
may be used to correct the problem. Segmental
resection and microsurgical anastomosis can
yield a 40% pregnancy rate,7 and tuboplasty using a catheter has been found to yield a 34% pregnancy rate.8
There are also a number of techniques
available to more directly effect conception. In
vitro fertilization with embryo transfer ("IVF") 9
involves collecting ova and sperm to fertilize in
the laboratory. If fertilization is successful, the
embryo is placed in the uterus for implantation.
Successful pregnancies result in 20% to 25% of
the cases.' 0
Two other techniques of manual conception are gamete intrafallopian transfer ("GIFT")
and zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT")."
GIFT involves placing ova and concentrated
sperm in the fallopian tube; ZIFT utilizes IVF
and places the resulting zygote in the fallopian
tube. These techniques are roughly twice as ef2
fective as IVE'
IVF, GIFT, ZIFT, and other similar procedures13 utilize ova artificially collected and,

therefore, can be done with donor ova. Donor
oocytes 14 may be collected from other women
undergoing fertility treatments; from women undergoing other pelvic or abdominal surgeries; or
from those specifically solicited to be donors.' 5
With respect to genetic parentage, this is the opposite situation to AID.
Surrogate embryo transfer ("SET") 16 involves the removal of an embryo from a surrogate by uterine lavage and implantation in an-
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other woman. This is similar to a donated oocyte, except that the egg is first fertilized in the
donor's body, typically by artificial insemination.
This unexhausted list of assisted reproductive technologies presents legal and ethical
questions on a number of fronts: manipulation
of the gametes, zygotes, or embryos; parentage;
and the like. Alexander Capron assembled a useful table of different reproductive possibilities:

The focus of the present discussion will
focus on legal issues which arise from state regulation of these new reproductive techniques.
Questions of custody also arise where more than
the gamete donors are involved in the reproductive process. The legal issues of custody battles,

Table 1. Reproductive possibilities.'7
No.

____I

Method

Genetic

Source

j

I

Fertilization
_

Gestation

-__

•

Social

Parents

I

Traditional Reproduction

XM & YM

Natural

M

M &M

2

Artificial Insemination, Husband

XM & YM

AI

M

M &M

3

Test Tube Baby

XM&YM

IVF

M

M&M

4

Artificial Insemination, Donor

XM & YD

Al

M

M &M

5A

Donated Egg

XD & YM

IVF

M

M&M

5B

Transferred Egg

XD

AI with embryo flushing

M

M &M

6

Surrogate Motherhood

X, & YM

Al

D

M &M

7A

Test Tube Baby in Rented Womb

XM & YM

IVF

D

M &M

7B

Transfer to Rented Womb

XM & YM

Natural or Al with
embryo flushing

D

M &M

8

Postnatal Adoption

XD & YD

Natural, Al, or IVF

D

M &M

9

Substitute Father

XM &

IVF

M

M &M

10

Brave New World

X, & Y2

IVF or Natural/Al/with
embryo flushing

3

4 &5

& YM

YD

Abbreviations: X = female, Y = male, Al = artificial insemination,
IVF = in vitro fertilization, D = donor, M = member of married couple.
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however, are beyond the scope of this article. 8
II. Policy background
Restrictions on the use of reproductive
technology have originated from legislation, physicians, hospitals, and third-party payers. The
legal issues differ depending on the status of the
party' 9 and the type of restriction.

the number of embryos created and destroyed,
and the number of female egg recipients.'
New Hampshire requires medical evaluation and counseling relating to IVF and restricts
such techniques to those patient over 21 years of
age.26 Gamete donors must undergo medical
evaluation as well. 27 Finally, a preembryo cannot be maintained ex utero for more than 14 days

Table 2. Limitations on assistedreproductive technologies.

IAction

IState action?

I

IssuesI

Direct state prohibition
/Fundamental
right to procreation via technology?
.. .. sa .......
o...................................................... ...
............... ......un.
...........................................................................
Indirect state prohibition
/
Burden on fundamental right to procreation?
* Fetal experimentation ban'
Distinction between therapeutic and experimental?
* Limitations on embryo handling"
" Responsibility of use 2
............................................................
..........................................................................................
Selective state prohibition
/
Equal protection?
* Age2 3
Discrimination against disabled?
* Medical qualification24
" Social qualification
............................................................
..........................................................................................
Refusal of state institution to perform
V
Affirmative obligation by government?
......................................................................................
................................ .........................................................................................................
Refusal of state to fund t
V
Affirmative obligation by government?
Refusal of third-party payor to fund*
......................................................................................

Refusal of private physician to perform"tII

................................

t See infra section IV.B. at 215.

: See infra section II.D. at

tt See infra section II.C. at 197.

197.

A. State legislation
Perhaps due to the speed by which assisted reproductive technologies is evolving, only
four states: Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Louisiana, have passed legislation directly regulating the use of such techniques.
Pennsylvania requires the reporting of IVF statistics. The state collects data on IVF providers,
194 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Interpretation of insurance contract?
ERISA?
.......................................................................................
.Di-s-crimination?

if unfrozen. s
Virginia requires HIV testing of gamete
donors involved in an assisted reproductive procedure.29 Moreover, physicians who provide such
treatment must disclose success rates at their institution.'
Louisiana has the most extensive regulation of assisted reproductive technologies. It
Volume 8, number 3

B. Fetalexperimentationregulation
In 1994, the Human Embryo Research
Panel of the National Institutes of Health issued
a report supporting federal funding of human
embryo research so long as strict guidelines are
observed.33 The panel endorsed research on

adopts the standards of the American Fertility
Society and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.3 Furthermore, the statute sets forth standards regarding ownership, responsibilities, and duties of those involved in
reproductive technology use.32

Table 3. State regulationoffetal experimentation.
~state

..

_jpeuticInostic
Illinois
.....................................

Louisiana
.....................................
Maine

Exemptionst for:

Statute

ILL. COMP. STAT. ch.
720, § 510/6 (1995)

I............ "...............................

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§40:1299.35.13(1995)
............................................

Thera-

Assist.

Diag-

Repro.

*

C
................

IVF exempted; this law declared unconstitutional
by Lifchez v. Hartigan

"'...........................................................................................................

..............

This law declared unconstitutional by
MargaretS. v. Edwards
................ ................. ................. ..........................................................................................

B

ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 22, § 1593 (1994)

................

.................................................................................................

M assachusetts

Comnmen Its

A,E

MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 12J (1995)

................

.........................................................................................

Diagnostic test exempted if purpose is to determine
life or health of fetus

*

......................................................................................
................
. ................
................
.. .....................................
.....................................

Michigan
.....................................

Minnesota
.....................................

Missouri

MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.15(2685) (1993)

............................................

STAT.
MINN.
§ 145.422 (1994)

............................................

Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 188.037 (1994)

.................................................................................

New Mexico
.....................................

North Dakota
.....................................

Pennsylvania

N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-9A-3 (1995)

............................................

CODE § 14N.D. CENT.
(1995)
02.2-01

............................................

D
................

C,F
...............

A,E

PA. CONS. STAT.
(1995)
§183216(A)

B

GEN. LAWS
R.I.
(1994)
§ 11-54-1(a)

A,E

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-310 (1995)

..........................................................................................................

................

.........................................................................................................

Research harmless to conceptus permitted

0
................

0

IVF exempted where every fertilized ovum is
implanted in recipient

....................................................................................................

0

Diagnostic test exempted if purpose is to determine
life or health of fetus

.................

........................................................................................

................ .................

........................................................................................

.............. . ...............

.................................................................................................

Utah

................

B
................

.................................................................................................

Rhode Island

................

B
................

.........................................................................................

................

*
...............

................

Diagnostic test exempted if purpose is to determine
life or health of fetus

.........................................................................................

Testing for genetic defects permitted; this law
declared unconstitutional by Jane L v. Bangerter

t The symbol "." indicates that the law explicitly exempts either diagnostic research activity or the use of particular
types of assisted reproductive technologies.
t "A" = Therapeutic use is to preserve the life or health of the fetus or mother. "B" = Therapeutic use is to preserve
the life or health of the fetus only. "C"= Therapeutic use is to meet health needs of fetus only. "D" = Only nontherapeutic
research prohibited; nontherapeutic use allowed if it will not substantially jeopardize fetus. "E" = Procedures incident
to the study of human fetus allowed if they do not substantially jeopardize fetus. "F" = Treatment and diagnostic
testing conducted by formal protocols and the necessary for care of mother are exempted.
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embryos less than two weeks old, where the number of embryos used is kept to the minimum necessary. While the controversy regarding embryo
and fetal experimentation on the federal level
concerns only funding, the states have been more
aggressive in limiting experimentation.34
Although state regulations have exemptions for therapeutic and diagnostic use, some
courts have difficulty distinguishing between
experimental and therapeutic use of reproductive technologies. Concern has developed because many reproductive technologies are on the
cutting edge of technology and, therefore, could
be construed as experimental. Thus, diagnostic
procedures giving a woman information relevant
to the decision whether to abort a genetically
defective fetus and therapeutic procedures used
to treat infertility, could be prohibited under these
laws.
Two federal courts of appeals have found
such laws unconstitutionally vague. In Marga-

eral competing and equally viable definitions, the
term 'experimentation' does not place health care
providers on adequate notice of the legality of
38

their conduct.
3 9 made
The case of Lifchez v. Hartigan
explicit what MargaretS. and Jane L. tangen-

tially touch on: prohibiting experimentation
treads on constitutionally protected use of therapeutic reproductive technologies. The Lifchez
court first started with the conclusion that "experimentation" is a vague concept. "Whether or
not any particular procedure is experimental or
routine is not as important as the fact that many
procedures begin as the former and become the
latter. It is this process that counts, not the classification at any particular point in time."' The
court went further, however, by declaring a ban
on experimentation which would restrict constitutionally protected reproductive technologies.
The court cited embryo transfer and chorionic
villi sampling as procedures that would be conret S. v. Edwards,35 the 5th Circuit struck down a sidered as experimental, and stated that the statLouisiana law prohibiting experimentation on a ute would violate constitutional reproductive
fetus, except where such experimentation was privacy by interfering with the use of such techtherapeutic to the fetus. It stated:
nologies.
Embryo transfer is a procedure designed
[E]ven medical treatmentcan be reasonably
to enable an infertile woman to bear her own
described as both a test and an experichild. It takes no great leap of logic to see that
ment.... The whole distinction between
within the cluster of constitutionally protected
experimentation and testing, or between
choices that includes the right to have access to
research and practice, is therefore almost
contraceptives, there must be included within that
meaningless in the medical context ....We
cluster the right to submit to a medical procetherefore think that this statute 'simply has
dure that may bring about, rather than prevent,
no core' that unquestionably applies to cerpregnancy. Chorionic villi sampling is similarly
tain activities, and we hold that it is unconprotected. The cluster of constitutional choices
stitutionally vague."
that includes the right to abort a fetus within the
first trimester must also include the right to subThe 10th Circuit took a parallel approach mit to a procedure designed to give information
37
to a similar Utah statute in JaneL. v. Bangerter. about that fetus which can then lead to a deciThe court stated that "[blecause there are sev- sion to abort.4'
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In declaring the prohibition on fetal experimentation unconstitutional, the court, therefore, recognized that the use of new (and possibly experimental) reproductive technologies is a
protected procreative decision.
C. Health care providers
Although the number of statutory controls on reproductive technologies is limited, restrictions imposed by health care providers are
plentiful.42 Fertility treatment specialists commonly shun single and lesbian candidates.43 Similarly, women aged 40 and older, for whom assisted reproductive technologies may seem particularly useful, will most likely find reluctance
in the medical community to provide fertility
treatments. 44
Fertility programs impose obstacles by
implementing a number of restrictions. The desire of some to promote a particular type of family may account for restrictions based on marital
status, marital stability, sexual orientation, age,
etc. Closely related to the ideal image of the family is a concern for the well-being of the future
child. Classifications related to approved
parenting ability may include: presence of mental or physical handicap; psychiatric history;
wealth; drug use; criminal background; or even
general good or bad character. Medical
contraindications to some reproductive techniques consist of age, medications, smoking,
carrier status for genetic defect, etc. The legality
of such restrictions depends on a number of factors, including antidiscrimination laws, status of
the program, and type of restriction.
D. Third-party payers
While the use of reproductive technologies may be legally protected, many people cannot realistically have access to them without
1996

agreement by third-party payers to cover such
procedures. The obligations of a government
welfare body are discussed infra sections IV.B.
& C. A health insurance program will usually
not face the same issues as a state actor,45 but a
number of constraints continue to remain.
Several states mandate that insurance
policies must cover particular treatments for infertility. Fertility treatments including in
vitro fertilization must be a covered expense in
Arkansas,' Connecticut,47 Hawaii,' Illinois, 49
Maryland,50 and Texas. 5 California mandates
coverage of infertility treatments, including gamete intrafallopian transfer, but excludes in vitro
fertilization.52 Massachusetts 53 and Rhode Island54 require coverage for fertility treatments.
Montana, 55 Ohio,56 and West Virginia 57 classify

infertility treatment as a "basic health care service" that health maintenance organizations must
provide.
Where there is no state law requirement
for coverage, the scope of an insurance plan's
coverage is a matter of interpreting the wording
of the policy. Generally, insurance policies are
construed in a manner most favorable to the beneficiary. "If more than one interpretation of an
exclusion is reasonable, the one affording coverage to the insured will be adopted. The insurer
has the burden of proving the facts which limit
coverage. 58
The interpretation of insurance policies
with respect to infertility coverage has been inconsistent. Some courts have held that "illness"
encompasses infertility and that artificial insemination59 and in vitro fertilization' are treatments
for that illness despite the fact that such therapies do not correct the underlying problem. Other
courts, however, have rejected coverage for reproductive technologies where such coverage
was not explicitly promised. An Oklahoma apFeatureArticle 9 197

pellate court took the position that in vitro fer- The court in Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. 72 contilization was not "medically necessary" to cor- cluded for the purposes of the ADA that infertilrect infertility, because the procedure did not fix ity could be a physical impairment and that it
the underlying medical condition.6' In another did implicate a major life activity. 73 Zatarain v.
decision from New York, the court refused to find WDSU-Television, Inc. 74 followed in part by statsperm banking by the patient was necessary dur- ing that infertility was an impairment, but coning cancer treatment, where the chemotherapy cluded that reproductive dysfunction did not afwould render the patient sterile. 6 The inconsis- fect a major life activity as anticipated by the
tency in insurance policy interpretation does not ADA.75 The ADA, however, may apply where
appear to be explained by any coherent frame- the denial of fertility services was premised on
work.63
other applicable disabilities, such as mental or
This structure of insurance policy inter- physical handicap, perhaps in an effort by a health
pretation is inapplicable where an employee ben- care provider to assure a good family outcome.7 6
efit plan falls under the scope of the Employee Furthermore, other antidiscrimination laws may
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").6 4 proscribe restrictions on the availability of asSimply stated, ERISA preempts certain state sisted reproductive technologies. Federal, state,
laws.65 Under ERISA, the standard of review and municipal antidiscrimination laws may be
regarding the employee benefit package is typi- applicable to classifications such as marital stacally "arbitrary and capricious" as the "benefit tus and sexual orientation.
plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility benefits IV. Constitutional considerations
or to construe the plan." 66 Under this standard,
In order to examine the claims of state
court decisions have similarly been mixed.67
interests described infra section V, it is necessary to evaluate constitutional considerations.
III. Americans with Disabilities Act
Section V. will focus on the discussion of state
The Americans with Disabilities Act interests and issues of balancing interests; how("ADA") is one statute which frames the debate ever, a preliminary discussion of the appropriate
68
level of concern the state must have before limiabout restrictions on reproductive technologies.
The definition of disability under the ADA is tations are placed and whether they pass Constibroadly understood to be an impairment that sub- tutional muster is necessary. Before addressing
stantially limits a major life activity.69 Under this the state interest in regulating assisted reproducdefinition, infertility could be construed to be a tive technologies, the court needs to determine
disability for the purposes of the ADA. There- whether there is a substantive due process right
fore, if a decision to refuse to treat infertility was to procreation and whether equal protection guarconstrued to be discrimination on the basis of antees require heightened scrutiny of state restricthat disability, the ADA would constrain limita- tions. Depending on the outcome of this analysis, the state interest in regulating assisted reprotions on fertility treatment.7 °
Courts remain split on the question of ductive technologies may need to be either comwhether infertility is a disability under theADA.7" pelling, substantial, or simply rational.
198 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Volume 8, number 3

compared Griswold's protection of a married
A. Right to procreation
Courts have held in a number of cases couple's access to contraceptives and stated that
that there is a constitutional right to privacy "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is
stemming from the Due Process Clause of the the right of the individual,married or single, to
Fourteenth Amendment 77 that extends to issues be free from unwarranted governmental intruconcerning family and procreative matters. This sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
interpretation of the right to privacy was articu- person as the decision whether to bear or beget
8 the first in a a child."84
lated in Griswold v. Connecticut,"
series of cases dealing with contraceptives,
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l 85 dewhich held that a law prohibiting distribution of cided a New York statute limiting access to concontraceptives to married couples would violate traceptives burdened the right set forth in
the constitutional right to privacy. Penumbras Griswold and Eisenstadt, and, therefore, such a
law violated the
of the First, Third,
protection of the
Fourth, Fifth and
NinthAmendments
right to privacy.
Penumbras of t he First, Third,
The regulation in
created a "zone
Fifth
an
Fourth,
question prohibNinth
d
of privacy" that
ited distribution
reated a "zone
applied to the
cl
Amendments
states through the
of contraceptives
Fourteenth
to individuals unof privacy" thai applied to the
der 16 years of
Amendment.7 9 To
age, and it restates through the Fourteenth
justify a policy that
quired that a
violates such a
Amendment.
pharmacist otherright, "[w]here
wise be the sole
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the distributor of contraceptives. The court exState may prevail only upon showing a subordi- plained that "[r]ead in light of its progeny, the
teaching of Griswoldis that the Constitution pronating interest which is compelling."8
While Griswold suggested that the "in- tects individual decisions in matters of
timate relation of husband and wife and their childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the
physician's role in one aspect of that relation" 8 ' State. Restrictions on the distribution of contrafell within a sphere of constitutionally protected ceptives clearly burden the freedom to make
activity, the case of Eisenstadt v. Baird 82 used such decisions. 86 Describing categories of ismore expansive language which referred to pro- sues insulated by the right to privacy, it was
creative decisions (although this was dicta). Us- "clear that among the decisions that an indiing a rational basis test, the Eisenstadtcourt held vidual may make without unjustified governthat the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth ment interference are personal decisions 'relatAmendment 3 protects distribution of contracep- ing to marriage; procreation; contraception; famtives to unmarried persons while married per- ily relationships; and child rearing and educasons do not face similar sanctions. The Court tion."'87
1996
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M

In referring to procreation as an activity
protected by the right to privacy, the CareyCourt
cited88 Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson.89 Skinner decided that an Oklahoma
law which mandated sterilization of a particular
class of criminals was unconstitutional. The Skinner Court held the statute punished grand larcenists more severely than it did embezzlers, and
therefore, denied equal protection. However, the
classification was subject to strict scrutiny because, it burdened the defendant's reproductive
choice by mandating sterilization of grand larcenists: 90
We are dealing here with legislation which
involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the
race. The power to sterilize, if exercised,
may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it
can cause races or types which are inimical
to the dominant group to wither and disap91
pear.
The language of the Court in this line of
cases has, in dicta, broadly protected the right to
procreation. Matters that fall within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy involve decisions "whether to bear or beget a child" 92 and
"in matters of childbearing."' 93 Laws governing
accessibility to and conditions for assisted reproductive technologies certainly touch upon those
matters. However, Court holdings in the areas of
contraceptives, sterilization, and abortion are not
precisely analogous to assisted reproductive technologies and, therefore, one needs to view the
sometimes broad language of the Court with care.

of tradition
Substantive due process protection is
seen by some as only protective of the rights intertwined in history and tradition of the country.
Procreation, when achieved by sexual activity
between consenting adults, is protected under the
right to privacy. Procreation conducted by assisted reproductive technologies is a relatively
new development, however, and the courts have
no explicit guidance from long-held "traditions"
that are often scrutinized to establish a due process right.
On a number of occasions, the Court has
stated its reluctance to broaden the scope of substantive due process:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due
Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution....

There should be, therefore, great resistance
to expand the substantive reach of those
Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitu94
tional authority.

The Court is likely to recognize those
substantive rights that have a historical basis and
are deeply-held. "Appropriate limits on substantive due process comes not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for
the teachings of history (and) solid recognition
1. Due process as a protection of the basic values that underlie our society."' 95
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In another formulation, the Court declared that
"the Due Process Clause affords only those protections 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '96
In determining whether the prior privacy
cases can legitimately be read to protect new assisted reproductive technologies, one needs to
determine whether such an application of precedent protects the basic liberties that have been
historically recognized. Clearly, the general category of "procreation" has been said to fall inside the zone of privacy. This, however, cannot
mean that all types of procreation, those proscribed or unpredictable in 1868, must be constitutionally protected. The factual background
and level of generality of the proposed right will
determine the outcome of such analysis.
For example, in Michael H. v. Gerald
9
7
D., the Court refused to overturn a statutory
presumption that a child born into a marriage was
a child of the marriage, despite proof of paternity by another man. The genetic father, Michael
H., lived with the child and the child's mother
(Gerald D.'s wife) at various times during the
child's first three years of life. Michael H. pursued a filiation action to establish paternity and
visitation rights, but Gerald D. was granted summary judgment in denying Michael H.'s action.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower
courts' decisions, recognized a substantive due
process right in family ties, 98 but did not extend
that protection to the biological father who had
lived with the mother and developed family ties
with the child shortly after the time of birth. The
reason for this limitation on the family aspect of
privacy rights was that the concept of family was
confined to the traditional, nuclear family. The
Court interpreted family privacy precedents as
resting upon "the historic respect-indeed, sanc1996

tity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop
within the unitary family." 99
One possible analogy can be drawn between MichaelH. and the case of assisted reproductive technologies: just as the concept of family was not historically understood to encompass
the variety of household arrangements seen in
modern times, it could be argued that the traditional understanding of procreation only encompassed married sexual procreation and not that
involving modern assisted reproductive technologies.
Such a comparison is unwarranted in applying the "pinched conception of 'the family ' ".0
to arrive at a similarly limited scope of procreation. Even the most restrictive methodology of
substantive due process analysis would not limit
procreation to historically understood techniques
of procreation. The plurality opinion of Michael
H.101
argued that, in analyzing the societal tradition for purposes of due process analysis, the
Court should:
[R]efer to the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified. If, for example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the
rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in gen02
eral.
The court did not recognize any family-related
substantive due process claim in Michael H. because adultery had traditionally been disfavored
throughout history in paternity situations. However, in the case of assisted reproductive techFeatureArticle * 201

nologies, there is arguably no history one way
or the other. Therefore, even using this pinched
methodology, the narrowest examination of the
historical meaning of procreative rights should
be at the level of procreation in general.
Other members of the Michael H. court
are more generous in their analysis of the scope
of substantive due process rights. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor noted that "[o]n occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level'
available. I would not foreclose the unanticipated
by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis."' 3 This particularly seems to
leave open substantive due process analysis for
the contemplation of new technologies.
The traditional and historical respect for
the right to procreate, recognized in the line of
Supreme Court cases previously discussed, can
be applied to the case of new assisted reproductive technologies. In determining that people
have the right to use artificial means to conceive,
there is no new principle of substantive due process, and no long-standing traditions proscribe
such activity. It is simply an application of traditional values to new technology. "[L]aw, equity
and justice must not themselves quail and be
helpless in the face of modern technological marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought
of."'114
The fact that new technology provides a
broader scope in exercising rights should not
mean that the Constitution cannot expand to accommodate such breakthroughs. "To be sure,
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are not to
be read as covering only the technology known
in the 18th century."'' 0 For example, the Fourth
Amendment proscription of warrantless
searches' °6 extended to public telephones because
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telecommunication technology had come to play
a vital role in private communication.0 7 The fact
the telephone use was unknown in 1791 did not
make its use fall outside of the protection of the
Constitution. Similarly, new procreative technologies provide opportunities to conduct activities in ways unknown at the time relevant constitutional rights were declared. Yet, the underlying principle of procreative freedom remains
unchanged by history and tradition.
2. Sexual liberty v. procreative
liberty

A second point of distinction is that cases
regarding contraception implicitly involve matters of sexuality, whereas assisted reproductive
technologies do not. Indeed, one point of the new
technologies is that they separate sex from reproduction.0 8 The contraception cases do not
clearly separate out constitutional respect for "the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms"'1 9 from
concern about the actual physiological process
of creating offspring. The Court certainly wishes
to protect some of "the most intimate of human
activities and relationships,"" 0 but such language
condenses concern about sexual liberty and procreation into one issue. Traditionally, the two
have been intertwined, but with the advent of new
technologies, a dissection of these cases should
recognize that "[s]exual liberty would not necessarily entail reproduction (merely sex with
contraception), and a right to reproduce would
not necessarily entail sexual freedom beyond the
sexual or other acts required for reproduction."'I
Clearly, there are elements of both sexual
liberty and procreative choice underlying the rationales in the contraceptive rights cases. However, the court needs to determine whether the
two elements are needed in combination to justify the recognition of a constitutional privacy
Volume 8, number 3

or whether variations in one or the other are independently sufficient.
It is questionable whether sexual liberty,
separated from procreation, is adequate to raise
a claim of substantive due process. The 1986
decision of Bowers v. Hardwick 2 suggests such
a position. In Bowers, the Court held that a Georgia statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy did
not violate due process. After reciting previous
cases dealing with family, marriage and procreation concerns, the Court distinguished homosexual sodomy because "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has
3
been demonstrated.""
The denial of due process protection for
sexual activity in Bowers established that the line
of contraception cases was not solely dependent
on private sexual behavior to establish a privacy
right:
[A]ny claim that these cases nevertheless
stand for the proposition that any kind of
private sexual conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from
state proscription is unsupportable. Indeed,
the Court's opinion in Carey twice asserted
that the privacy right, which the Griswold
line of cases found to be one of the protections provided by the Due Process Clause,
did not reach so far."14
Basically, this seems to be an accurate
representation of Carey, which, while demanding a compelling state interest to justify the restriction of contraception distribution, made the
following caveat:
[W]e do not hold that state regulation must
meet this [compelling interest] standard
1996

"whenever it implicates sexual freedom" or
"affect(s) adult sexual relations" but only
when it "burden(s) an individual's right to
decide to prevent conception or terminate
pregnancy by substantially limiting access
to the means of effectuating that decision."
As we observe below, "the Court has not
definitely answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating (private consensual sexual) behavior among
adults," and we do not purport to answer
that question now." 5
Presumably this indicates that sexual liberty
alone was not the sole basis for the demand that
a compelling state interest justify the restriction
on contraceptive access.
However, sexual liberty seems to be at
least an undercurrent in the contraception cases,
even though the language does not allocate the
derivation of the privacy right between sexuality and biological reproduction. The sacred
sphere of private, intimate relations certainly was
part of the basis for Carey's protection of "the
most intimate of human activities and relationships."" 6 Carey was an extension of Griswold's
respect for the marital bedroom." 7 Furthermore,
the contraception cases dealt with the right to
make the decision not to procreate. Therefore,
there was a right to engage in sexual activities
without pregnancy. It was assumed by the Court
that without sex there would be no procreation
(an assumption that is undermined by technical
advancements in reproductive technologies.)
The constitutional protection of sexual
activity within the institution of marriage seems
clear.1 8 It did not, however, proscribe all regulations of sexual activity." 9 The Court in
Eisenstadt, reasoned that the Equal Protection
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Clause guaranteed the availability of contraceptives to unmarried couples who engaged in sex.
The basis for the decision in Eisenstadtcentered
on the reduced probability of procreation, and
not a right to have sex. The Court did not reach
the question of whether there was some fundamental right to engage in sex; 20 it only said that
under a rational basis requirement for state legislation,' 2' "[i]t would be plainly unreasonable
to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed
pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as
22
punishment for fornication.'
The contraception cases involve situations where the Court found it unconstitutional
for the state to refuse access to contraceptives to
couples who were engaging in sex. The preceding discussion shows that, while there was concern about regulation of intimate relations between two people, these cases did not solely rest
upon sexual liberty, nor did they decide whether
consensual nonmarital sexual activity was protected by the constitution.' 23 Therefore, the constitutional standard described in the contraception cases is at least partly based on the biological right to procreation. It is not stated, however, whether absent any sort of sexual privacy,
there is a right to procreation. Procreation was
necessary to the rights in the Griswold/Careyline
of cases, but in those decisions, the Court was
unclear whether it was sufficient.
Other cases clarify the distinction between sexual liberty and procreation. Courts are
divided on the question of the constitutionality
of restrictions on consensual, heterosexual 24 activity between unmarried individuals. "[A]mong
the courts addressing the constitutionality of punishing consensual, heterosexual acts between
consenting adults in private, there is a significant division throughout the country." 25 Where
the question has been raised, the analysis of a
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number of courts makes it clear that the question
of sexual liberty is subordinate to the right to
procreate: where there is a right to engage in
sexual activity it exists because of its role in procreation.
In Doe v. Duling,2 6 the district court

found that Virginia's fornication ban violated the
constitutional right to privacy, premising the proscription of sexual behavior on its necessity in
vindicating the right to procreate. "Necessarily
implicit in the right to make decisions regarding
childbearing is the right to engage in [unmarried]
sexual intercourse. To hold otherwise would result in the constitutional right to decide whether
to bear or beget a child contingent on one's mari' 27
tal status.'
In Zablocki v. Redhail,18 the Court held
a law prohibiting defaulted payers of child support from marrying to be unconstitutional. The
Court seemed to imply that the importance of
sexual freedom was primarily incidental to its
necessity as a biological function in procreation:
Surely, a decision to marry and raise the
child in a traditional family setting must
receive equivalent [privacy right] protection. And, if appellee's right to procreate
means anything at all, it must imply some
right to enter the only relationship in which
the State of Wisconsin allows sexual rela29
tions legally to take place.
A Washington case, Singer v. Hara,30

rejected homosexual marriage on the ground that
the state's recognition of marriage was based on
its interest in procreation. It appears to follow
then homosexual partners, where there is not the
possibility of procreation, could be deprived of
the right to marry . "The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution priVolume 8, number 3

marily because of societal values associated with
the propagation of the human race. Further, it is
apparent that no same-sex couple offers the pos3
sibility of the birth of children by their union." '
Doe, Zablocki, and Singer demonstrate
that when issues of sexuality and marriage are
seen to be constitutionally protected, this occurs
because procreation is dependent upon sexual
activity. This suggests that because biological
procreation is sufficient to force recognition of
sexual liberty, the basis of the privacy right in
matters of intimate relationships is primarily dependent on the ability to reproduce.

ship."' 136

The Eisenstadt Court used broad language in extending the privacy right to unmarried individuals,' 37 but ultimately decided the issue on an equal protection basis. 3 8 Furthermore,
the court found the law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to be lacking a rational
basis, so the Court reasoned that there was no
necessity in determining whether the law violated the "fundamental freedoms under
Griswold."'139 Therefore, the narrowest construction of Eisenstadtis that the Court simply found
punishment of
fornication by
The language of the
the threat of
3.
pregnancy irracontraception cases strongly
Marriedv. unmartional, 4 ° and
suggests that the substantive
riedprocreation
therefore, was
Arguably,
unable to distindue process right, not simply
the right to procreguish the case
ation recognized in
from
Griswold.
equal protection, extends to
the contraception
This protects the
single persons.
and sterilization
right to use concases extends only
traceptives by
to married couples.' 32 For example, in Skinner, unmarried persons, but leaves open the possibilafter the Court stated that procreation is "one of ity that the state may discover more rational reathe basic civil rights of man," it immediately fol- sons why unmarried persons should not reprolowed by concluding that "marriageand procre- duce, by either coitus or assisted reproductive
ation are fundamental to the very existence and technologies.
survival of the race."' 33 Similarly, in introducThe language of the contraception cases
ing an argument for the right to procreate as the strongly suggests that the substantive due probasis for striking down a maternity leave provi- cess right, not simply equal protection, extends
sion, the Court stated in ClevelandBd. of Educ. to single persons. The EisenstadtCourt explained
v. LaFleur3 4 that "freedom of personal choice in that "[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it
matters of marriageand family life is one of the is the right of the individual, married or single..
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause."' 35 •.,4"1
The Court's references to the right to priAnd, of course, in Griswold, the court defended vacy are uniformly grounded in substantive due
the right to privacy because an effort to end con- process. In the same passage, the Eisenstadt
traceptive use was "repulsive to the notions of Court cited Skinner,approving the establishment
privacy surrounding the marriage relation- of such a right. If Skinner was originally con1996
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fined in its scope to married people, this clearly
implies that it applies equally to unmarried individuals.
Perhaps the simplest answer to narrow
interpretations of Eisenstadt is that the Carey
Court unambiguously explained the scope of the
contraception cases confer due process privacy
rights upon both married and single persons.
Careyrequired that restrictions upon distribution
of contraceptives to adults be based on a "compelling state interest." 42 The appellants in the
case explicitly tested the theory that Eisenstadt
was limited as an equal protection guarantee. 43
The Court categorically rejected such construction of Griswold and Eisenstadt-

4. Positive v. negative rights
Another aspect of applying the contraception and abortion cases to the new field of
assisted reproductive technologies employs the
argument that past cases dealt with the "negative right" to be free from pregnancy,145 whereas
application of this class of privacy rights to new
technology asserts a "positive right"'" to become
pregnant. 147 The extension of the right from negative to positive depends upon the construction
of the underlying values of procreative rights.148
It is still necessary, therefore, to focus on
the meaning of procreation and determine
whether it is simply based on the interest in bodily
integrity in being free from pregnancy (thereby
implying only negative procreative rights), or
This intrusion into the "sacred precincts of
whether there is a broader interest in controlling
marital bedrooms" made that statute parthe outcome of procreative decisions. 49 If proticularly "repulsive" [in Griswold]. But
creative rights as recognized by the Court in its
subsequent decisions have made clear that
contraception and abortion decisions is based in
the constitutional protection of individual
a narrow conception of bodily integrity-the
autonomy in matters of childbearing is not
right to be free from the burden of pregnancydependent on that element.... [Eisenstadt,
then only the negative right from pregnancy is
Roe v. Wade, and Whalen v. Roe] put
implicated.5 0
Griswold in proper perspective. Griswold
Predicting the course of substantive due
may no longer be read as holding only that
process doctrine in this area by the Supreme
a State may not prohibit a marriedcouple's
Court is a difficult task. 5 ' The Court's relucuse of contraceptives. Read in light of its
tance to expand the scope of privacy' 5 2 must be
progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that
balanced against language in cases such as Skinthe Constitution protects individual deciner,Eisenstadt, and Carey which could certainly
sions in matters of childbearing from unsupport a "positive" construction of the right to
justified intrusion by the State.'"
procreation. Furthermore, jurists (post Bowers)
have not indicated how they would run in the
This statement makes clear that there is future. Nevertheless, a careful examination of
key
no inferior procreative right for unmarried per- Supreme Court cases, lower
court decisions insons. Furthermore, the discussion infra section terpreting them, and policy considerations sugIV.A.4. establishes that the basis for the right to gest the principle enunciated
in the procreation
procreate covers both achieving and avoiding and family rights cases apply
to the "positive"
pregnancy.
use of assisted reproductive technologies.
The plain language of Eisenstadtimplies
206 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Volume 8, number 3

that the decision whether to create offspring, not
the negative burden of pregnancy, is central to
the privacy right of procreation:

possibility of a positive right to procreation. Indeed, the dissent in Planned Parenthood of
SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey'5 6 criticized
the broad interpretation of substantive due proIf the right of privacy means anything, it is
cess and appeared more willing to constrict the
the right of the individual,married or single,
scope of negative rights to procreation in the area
to be free from unwarranted governmental
of abortion than it was with respect to other posiintrusion into matters so fundamentally aftive 157 procreative rights.'58 In Michael H., the
fecting a person as the decision whether to
plurality recognized that "the term 'liberty' in
53
bear or beget a child.
the Due Process Clause extends beyond freedom
from physical restraint."' 59 In describing the
Presumably, if the Court was simply de- scope of recognized procreative rights, the Bowcrying the burden of carrying a child as a viola- ers court described such cases as acknowledgtion of privacy, it could have used narrower lan- ing the "fundamental individual right to decide
guage to emphasize personal bodily integrity in- whether or not to beget or bear a child."' 6
stead of the choice of whether to bear or beget a
In this debate about the basis of procrechild. "54
' There are good reasons to view the ative rights, language from Carey makes it clear
choice, positive or negative, to procreate as that the actual choice regarding procreation, not
within the realm of constitutionally protected simply bodily integrity, underlies the right to proprivacy:
creation:
Procreation may be as central to a single
person's identity and life-plan as it is for a
married person. Single parent families are
increasingly common, and there is no evidence showing that a marriage environment,
though perhaps desirable, is essential for
healthful childrearing. Moreover, the right
of single persons to bear and rear children
that they have [already] conceived is firmly
established. Recognizing the right of single
persons to conceive is thus a marginal, not
a major shift. 5
The desire for a person to produce offspring
is not socially regarded as less of a private decision than the choice to use contraceptives in preventing pregnancy or to terminate a pregnancy.
The most limited interpretations of substantive due process stop short of excluding the
1996

The decision whether or not to beget
or bear a child is at the very heart of this
cluster of constitutionally protected choices.
That decision holds a particularly important
place in the history of the right of privacy..
. This is understandable, for in a field that
by definition concerns the most intimate of
human activities and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent
conception are among the most private and
sensitive.' 6
A similar sentiment was declared in Skinner, in which the Court used strict scrutiny for
its equal protection analysis as a consequence of
a sterilization law's burden on the right to procreation. The Court characterized the positive
right to remain fertile as:
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[I]nvolv[ing] one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands
it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and dis162
appear.
The abuse of power the Skinner Court
feared is certainly a possibility if the state decides to place restrictions upon assisted reproductive technologies. For many infertile couples,
only the new technology will allow them to reproduce. To allow the state to regulate a field so
central to reproductive choices removes the
check that individual decision-making places on
potentially "evil or reckless hands."'6 3
Even before Carey, the Court recognized
the "positive" aspect of procreative rights in
ClevelandBd. of Educ. v. LaFleur.64 The Court
found mandatory, unpaid maternity leave to have
unjustifiably impinged on a female teacher's procreative rights. A positive right to procreation is
necessarily implied because maternity leave cannot be implemented until the choice of procreation is positively exercised. The Court explained
that:
As we noted in Eisenstadtv. Baird, there is
a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." By acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive
maternity leave regulations can constitute
a heavy burden on the exercise of these pro-
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tected freedoms.... [P]ublic school maternity leave rules directly affect "one of the
65
basic civil rights of man."1
Lower courts have, in the few cases dealing with assisted reproductive technologies, similarly recognized that the right to procreation encompasses a positive right. 66An Illinois statute
that outlawed fetal experimentation unless it was
therapeutic to the fetus itself was struck down
on grounds was vague and that it violated the
right to procreate. The court in Lifchez v.
Hartigan,16 in explaining the reach of Carey,
stated that:
It takes no great leap of logic to see that
within the cluster of constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have
access to contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring
68
about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.
Further, a Federal District Court in Ohio
reached a similar interpretation of procreative
rights. A teacher who alleged discrimination under Title VII, § 1983, and state law for
nonrenewal of her contract because she utilized
artificial insemination was denied relief on the
facts. Yet, in determining the claim, the court established that procreative rights encompass the
positive right to become pregnant. "[T]he Supreme Court's precedent is clear. A woman has
a constitutional right to control her reproductive
functions. Consequently, a woman possesses the
right to become pregnant by artificial insemina69
tion."1
This interpretation is opposed by those
who believe history and tradition serve as the
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primary basis for the right not to procreate. For
example, Professor Massie argues that:
The right to contraception or abortion serves
autonomy values and also reflects society's
traditional interests in preventing the birth
of illegitimate children and preserving the
marital family unit 7° as a viable entity....
If, as the cases indicate, our "history and
traditions" are the bases for defining the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause, then
one can make a strong argument that unmarried persons have no constitutionally
protected positive right to procreate, either
by coital or noncoital means. Any legislation denying them access to otherwise legal reproductive arrangements therefore
need meet only a rational basis test.'
This constrictive view of the Due Process Clause, however, misinterprets past case law.
While there has been an "insistence upon respect
for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society,"' 72 the focus is on the values, not the actual
practices,that need to have a solid grounding in
173
tradition and history.
Massie's support for her contention rests
upon the Court's decisions in Michael H. and
Bowers.'74 The plurality decision in Michael H.

may allude to such a stance,'75 but only a minority of the Court views the history and tradition
of a particular practice as the sole basis for due
process. 176 Bowers is also frequency cited for the
assertion that substantive due process is exclusively linked to historical practices. Yet, before
the Court discussed the historical basis for enforcement of anti-sodomy laws against homosexuals, it was obliged to state that "[n]o con-
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nection between family, marriage, or procreation
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
' 77
other has been demonstrated."'
However, contrary to Professor Massie's
assertion that "intimacy, personal identity, and
self-fulfillment alone will not trigger automatic
constitutional protection" because decisions like
Bowers see such claims as threatening to "historical notions of morality,"'' 78 it was only after
the court refused to establish a substantive right
to sodomy that the Bowers Court decided that a
state's "moral choices" could serve as a rational
basis for state legislation. 17 9 The state's interest
in morality per se has never been seen determinative in the recognition of fundamental rights.I I
The holding in Carey makes it clear that practices such as the reasonable commercial distribution of contraceptives, though without historical grounding as a traditional practice in 1791 or
1868, still enjoy constitutional protection simply because they are intricately connected with
choices of a fundamental nature. 8' It is equally
clear that historical disapproval of illegitimacy' 82
did not play a role in finding a right to the use of
contraceptives. 183 Procreation is recognized as
within the zone of privacy because due process
encompasses "a right of personal privacy, "184 not
concerns of the state.
5. Elements ofprocreation: genetic, social,and gestational
The discussion of the right to procreation
above assumes the use of "standard reproductive technologies," where the genetic parents utilize new technologies to permit the gestation of
their own child. In these situations, it seems that
the right to procreation protects "decisions in
matters of childbearing."' 85 However, some types
of reproductive technologies permit couples to
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break down the concept of "childbearing" into
three discrete aspects: genetic, social, and gestational. The genetic element is defined by identity of the gamete providers. The social element
contemplates the intent to raise the child as one's
own. The gestational element refers to the
woman who carries and gives birth to the child.
While procreation may be constitutionally protected where all three elements coincide in one
couple, is it necessaryto have all three elements
for due process to attach? The presence of which
factors are sufficient to establish a right? This
section will discuss the elements comprising the
right to procreation.
Professor John Robertson first suggested
this approach to understanding procreational
rights, when he argued that there is a liberty interest in each element:

Claims of procreative freedom logically extend to every aspect of reproduction: conception, gestation and labor, and
childrearing. Although these three components combine to create a powerful experience, however, each of them has personal
value and meaning independently of the
others.... A gene contributor may find genetic transfer a vital source of feelings connecting him or her with nature and future
generations.... Some women find enormous satisfaction and significance in pregnancy and childbirth.... Childrearing is a
rewarding and fulfilling experience. ...
Each aspect of reproduction can thus be a
separate source of fulfillment and significance closely related to what provided by
the other aspects. One thinks of oneself as

Table 4. Elements of various procreativearrangements.
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Gestational surrogacy
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DeBoer
Michael H.

"
/

n.a.

+/-"

n.a.

t This includes traditional coital reproduction, artificial insemination by husband, and other techniques such as in
vitro fertilization where the gametes come from the intended social parents.

t See discussion infra this section at 214.
tt See discussion supra section IV.A.1. at 201 & n.99.
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procreating whether one conceives without
gestating or rearing, gestates without rearing or conceiving, or rears without conceiving or gestating. Procreative freedom includes the right to separate the genetic, gestational, or social components of reproduction and to recombine them in collabora86
tion with others.1
Courts have acknowledged the analytic
reduction of procreation into its three elements
in disputes about gestational surrogacy 87 and
frozen embryo ownership.'88 Table 4 describes
the elements of procreation that are present with
various procreative arrangements.
Much of the case law that analyzes the
separate elements of procreation arise from conflicts where two parties are seeking custody of
one child; the procreative elements are divided
between the sides, and rights of the respective
parties must be balanced. It is helpful to review
the arguments and holdings of these cases to determine the relative and absolute weights of the
three elements of procreation.
Davis v. Davis 89 involved a custody dispute over frozen embryos. The ex-wife wanted
to have the embryos implanted, but the ex-husband argued, inter alia, that doing so would impinge on his protected procreative
decisionmaking. The Tennessee court recognized
that the right to procreation extended to both
positive and negative rights,"9 and implied that
implantation of the embryo would violate the
husband's right to avoid procreation. The state
interest in potential life for unimplanted embryos
was described as similarly weak in this case as it
was in the early stages of gestation for the purposes of abortion. "[T]he state's interest in potential human life is insufficient to justify an in-
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fringement on the gamete-providers'
9
procreational autonomy.'
The court suggested that the genetic element of procreation raised issues of a constitutional dimension:
Abortion cases have dealt with gestational
parenthood. In this case, the court must deal
with the question of genetic parenthood. We
conclude, moreover, that an interest in
avoiding genetic parenthood can be significant enough to trigger the protections afforded to all other aspects of parenthood.
The technological fact that someone unknown to these parties could gestate these
preembryos does not alter the fact that these
parties, the gamete-providers, would become parents in that event, at least in the
genetic sense. The profound impact this
would have on them supports their right to
sole decisional authority as to whether the
process of attempting to gestate these embryos should continue. 92
Despite this recognition, the court stopped far
short of the conclusion that genetic inheritance
by itself established afundamentalconstitutional
right. First, the court was only comparing the
right as against established Tennessee public
policy' 93 which did not recognize a weighty value
in the early stages of gestation; it never even
contemplated a countervailing compelling state
interest. Second, the court did not adopt an automatic veto by a gamete-provider, notwithstand94
ing the claimed negative procreational right.'
In fact, the court created a test to balance the
interests of the two genetic parents. 95
Johnson v. Calvert,'96 a California Supreme Court case, supplied additional language
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in support of a genetic basis for procreational
rights, albeit much of it in dicta. Johnson counterpoised the interests of a birth mother against
the genetic mother. A married couple, due to the
wife's hysterectomy and consequent inability to
gestate a child, created a fertilized egg from each
others genetic material and had it implanted in a
surrogate mother. When the surrogate (gestational) mother had doubts about her prior agreement to give up the child to the genetic parents,
the couple succeeded in being declared the natural parents. The court reasoned that both mothers (genetic and gestational) had some claim to
motherhood, but the court broke the tie by examining the social intent to raise the child. This
decision suggested that genetic parentage, when
combined with the social element of intent to
raise the child, is a weightier factor in procreation than is gestational motherhood.197 The decision further implied that gestational parentage
by itself, without a genetic tie or intent to socially raise the child, is insufficient to trigger due
process protection, but genetic parentage combined with intended social parentage may be protected.
In Johnson, the birth mother, Anna, contended that her constitutional parental rights were
abridged. Amicus curiae further argued that failure to recognize parental rights in a birth mother
violated the right to procreate. The court disagreed, finding that by making an agreement to
be a surrogate mother (forfeiting the social element of procreation), Anna had failed to make a
decision to procreate. Hence, the lack of a social
element of procreation, at least where the genetic
element is also missing, is fatal to a claim of a
constitutional right to procreation:
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A woman who enters into a gestational
surrogacy arrangement is not exercising her
own right to make procreative choices; she
is agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly important service without, by definition, any expectation that she will raise
198
the child as her own.
The court then more directly addressed the
question of due process. It found plausible the
argument that genetic and social elements absent a gestational element of procreation might
constitute a traditionally protected right:
Society has not traditionally protected the
right of a woman who gestates and delivers
a baby pursuant to an agreement with a
couple who supply the zygote from which
the baby develops and who intend to raise
the child as their own; such arrangements
are of too recent an origin to claim the protection of tradition. To the extent that tradition has a bearing on the present case, we
believe it supports the claim of the couple
who exercise the right to procreate in order
to form a family of their own, albeit through
novel medical procedures. 199
The broad language in Calvert,possibly
implying a constitutional right based only in genetics and social elements, is limited by a number of factors. First, the constitutional discussion
only concluded that gestational motherhood without the social or genetic elements was insufficient to trigger procreative rights protection. Any
further suggestion that genetic plus social elements were actually sufficient is dicta. This limitation was recognized in a later case decided by
a California appeals court. "The most that can
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be safely extracted from the opinion is that gestational surrogacy contracts do not necessarily
offend public policy. Indeed, the court did not
actually hold that the gestational surrogacy contract at issue in Johnson v. Calvert was enforceable as such." 2" In In re Moschetta, the court
noted the intent to raise the child-the social element-was only relevant as a tie breaker where
the genetic and gestational elements were split
between two women. Where both genetic motherhood and gestational motherhood are found in
one person, social intent is irrelevant.2 °'
Moschetta concludes that a traditional surrogacy
arrangement, although vesting the social element
in the genetic father's wife, is unenforceable in
light of the Uniform Parentage Act and adoption
statutes; the genetic/gestational mother is still the
natural mother under law.
The New York Supreme Court, in
McDonald v. McDonald, °2 adopted the reasoning of Johnsonv. Calvert2 3 in recognizing a gestational mother as the natural mother. In this divorce action, a child's father attempted to gain
sole custody of his children by arguing that his
ex-wife, who had used donor eggs, was not the
natural mother. The court disagreed, citing the
Johnson court's analysis that the tie between
gestational and genetic mothers is broken by social intent to raise a child. Because the ex-wife
was both a gestational and social mother, she was
24
the natural mother.
The Ohio case of Belsito v. Clark205 rejected the analytic framework used in Calvert
and McDonald. In a gestational surrogacy arrangement where the surrogate changed her mind
about giving up the child, the court criticized the
Calvert court's holding due to its difficulty in
application, conflict with public policy, and "failure to recognize and emphasize the genetic
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provider's right to consent to procreation and to
surrender potential parental rights."2 6 The court
found that a genetic tie was stronger than a gestational connection,2 7 and the gestational mother
could claim to be the natural parent only with
20 8
the genetic parents' consent.
These state custody cases, as a whole,
tend to favor genetic over gestational motherhood. However, the analyses given by these
courts fall short of establishing genetic parenthood as necessary and sufficient for the right to
procreation. Indeed, the unsettled question of
custody arising from gestational surrogacy arrangements tends to suggest that the basic values underlying procreation are embodied by all
three elements and that no single one or pair of
elements has a clear claim to the traditions and
history underlying substantive due process protections.
The limitations of the analyses in the state
cases become apparent by comparing the extent
of constitutional parental rights for family arrangements. Parental rights are distinct from procreative rights in that parental rights arise from
family structures already in existence, not those
desired to exist. Hence, parental rights do not
imply procreative rights, since the former may
arise from post-procreative family arrangements.2' However, limits on parental rights may
help to establish boundaries on the right to procreate. Consequently, the right to procreate would
be meaningless if courts did not recognize the
rights of parents to continued parentage.
In Michael H. v. GeraldD.,21 ° the Court
held that no fundamental parental right existed
for a child that was genetically fathered by a man
not married to the mother. The court reached this
conclusion because was because the adulterous
arrangement did not reflect the history and tra-

FeatureArticle * 213

ditions of society and, hence, was not protected the child for her entire life was insufficient to
as a fundamental right."' In essence, lack of a establish a parental right.
Given the insufficiency of the genetic or
proper social element in the family arrangement
undermined the genetic claim. Thus, a genetic social element, individually, to establish a clear
tie by itself does not create a relationship which constitutional right, we come to the question of
is recognized by the "basic values that underlie gestational surrogacy. This presents the question
' 212
of whether genetic and social elements of proour society.
In DeBoer v. DeBoer,1 3 the Supreme creation, without gestation, would be protected
Court refused to stay the Michigan Supreme by a fundamental right to procreation. Johnson
Court's determination that Jessica Clausen, the v. Calvert considered the question of gestational
DeBoer's adopted daughter, be returned to her surrogacy with respect to custody, but no court
genetic parents. 214 The DeBoers adopted the ge- has directly faced the question of whether the
netic/gestational daughter of Cara Clausen and use of gestational surrogacy is protected by a
raised the child for two years. During the course fundamental constitutional right to procreate.
Contrary to the assertion of Professor
of this time, however, the genetic father, Daniel
Schmidt, intervened. He successfully argued that Robertson, 1 6 procreation does not fall within the
his parental rights v7ere not properly terminated. protection of substantive due process without the
Therefore, he and Clausen should have custody presence of all three elements of procreation.
over the child. The DeBoers did not have a con- Technology by itself does not detract from the
stitutional parental right by virtue of their social personal meaning of procreation. Therefore, the
Due Process Clause would protect the use of stantie.
dard reproductive technologies where the same
[T]he DeBoers maintain that there is a procouple provides the genetic, gestational, and sotected liberty interest in their relationship
cial elements of procreation. Each element has
with the child .... From [parental rights]
been understood by the courts to be a weighty
cases, they extract the principles that it is
factor in procreation, and the removal of any elthe relationship between the parent and
ement undermines the basic values of procrechild that triggers significant constitutional
ation. The introduction of a third-party surrogate
protection and that the mere existence of a
alters the social understanding of procreation and
biological link is not determinative. We recannot be understood to be an arrangement that
'217
ject these arguments.... [A] third party does
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
not obtain such a substantive right by virThe contentious debate-judicial, legislative,2 ' 8
tue of the child's having resided with the
and academic 2 9-surrounding custody in
third party.... None [of the parental rights
surrogacy, as well as the troubling implications
cases] involved disputes between a natural
of utilizing a third party in the procreative proparent or parents on one side and nonparents
cess,22 removes surrogacy from the category of
215
on the other.
values historically and traditionally protected by
the 14th Amendment.
Thus, the social element of having raised
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B. Affirmative right to governmental
services
While it is argued supra section IV.A.4.
that there is a positive right to procreate protected
under the privacy rights cases, it seems fairly well
established that there is no obligation of the government to act affirmatively to vindicate that procreative right. Therefore, there is no obligation
for the government to provide or fund assisted
reproductive services under the Due Process
Clause. The government may not prevent a person from exercising constitutional rights; however, where for other reasons those rights are
denied, the government need not act to secure
them.
[The Due Process Clause] forbids the State
itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty,
or property without "due process of law,"
but its language cannot fairly be extended
to impose an affirmative obligation on the
State to ensure that those interests do not
come to harm through other means.... Its
purpose was to protect the people from the
State, not to ensure that the State protected
them from each other. The Framers were
content to leave the extent of governmental
obligation in the latter area to the democratic
political processes. Consistent with these
principles, our cases have recognized that
the Due Process Clauses generally confer
no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to
secure life, liberty, or property interests of
which the government itself may not deprive the individual.22 '

tient does not originate in state action, so there is
no state obligation to correct it.
The lack of an affirmative obligation by
the government has been clearly specified in the
22
area of reproductive rights. In Maher v. Roe,

the Court determined that funding childbirth,
while denying funding for nontherapeutic abortions, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court stressed that there was no abridgment
of the right recognized in Roe v. Wade223 because
the state did not actively preclude the exercise
of that right.
"There is a basic difference between direct
state interference with a protected activity
and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy.
Constitutional concerns are greatest when
the State attempts to impose its will by force
of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is
necessarily far broader.

'224

This principle was reaffirmed in Harris v.
McRae,225 which dealt with the denial of Title
XIX funding for medically necessary abortions.
"Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of
choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such
funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom. 226
In the case of infertility, the lack of an
ability to procreate arises from non-governmental sources that the state has no obligation to rectify. Therefore, a state actor, consistent with the
In the case of assisted reproductive tech- Due Process Clause, must neither provide repronologies, the reproductive dysfunction of a pa- ductive services nor fund them. This is the case
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even if some people will realistically be denied
the opportunity to procreate in light of such governmental policies.221
C. Equalprotection
The Equal Protection Clause 228 limits the
ability of the government to draw distinctions
between groups of people without proper reason. Where an action of the state "operates to
the disadvantage of some suspect class ' 229 or impinges upon a fundamental right 230 "explicitly or
implicitly protected by the constitution, 23' the
classification is subject to strict scrutiny. Otherwise, only a rational basis for the state action is
required.
1. Protected classes
When a state provides unequal treatment
to different classes of society, such action normally "will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. ' 232 Classifications based
on race, alienage, and national origin, however,
are subjected to strict scrutiny and must serve a
compelling state interest. 233 The Court has also
recognized a quasi-suspect status for a few other
groups. Intermediate scrutiny, where the classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective, applies to classification is based on gender23 4 and illegiti2 35
macy.
It is unlikely that any restrictions to access or provisions of assisted reproductive services would be subject to intermediate scrutiny
for discrimination based on gender. It is true that
because only women can become pregnant,
women would be more directly subject to some
types of restrictions on reproductive technologies.236 However, pregnancy-related disparities
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in the treatment of men and women are not impermissible for purposes of gender classification. 37
Some restrictions on assisted reproductive technologies may be aimed at maintaining
the integrity of the marital family unit. Depending on the nature of the arrangement, one can
argue that such restrictions may unjustifiably
classify based on illegitimacy. However, the child
who is potentially discriminated against has not
yet been conceived, and the classification does
not exist until after birth because "[i]llegitimacy
238
is a legal construct not a natural trait.
Discrimination against other groups is
sometimes characterized as invidious and arguably deserving of heightened scrutiny, at a minimum. 239 Thus, the courts would have to use a
less deferential standard than the rational basis
test. Potential groups within this category have
been contemplated in order to screen patients
seeking assisted reproductive technologies. Examples include sexual orientation, marital status, age, mental and physical handicap, presence
of genetic defect, and wealth.
A commonly suggested restriction is one
based on sexual orientation, either directly or
under the guise of serving married couples only.
Courts have determined that homosexuals are
neither an immutable class nor politically powerless. 2 0Therefore, a number of circuits have employed rational basis review in evaluating discriminatory classifications involving homosexuals. 241
Marital status is a classification many
programs use to screen potential assisted reproductive candidates. For example, in cases dealing with Social Security, the Court has upheld
the use of differentiated benefit levels depending on marital status. 2 42 However, providing ben-
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efits and services dependent on marital status, if
it impinges on the right to marry, may raise the
question of whether a fundamental interest is bur243
dened, as discussed infra section IV.C.2.
Another common classification suggested for parenthood is age. Concern is ex2
pressed both for the physiological capability "
of older women to withstand the physical demands of pregnancy and for children who may
have elderly parents. Misconception of the ability of older parents may possibly be based on
stereotypes, but the Court will subject age clas245
sifications to only rational basis review.
The desire to restrict the access to procreation for those with handicaps has a long history.2" This may be accomplished in the context
of reproductive services by preventing propagation of undesirable genetic characteristics and
ensuring that only those with the ability to properly care for offspring have children under certain reproductive programs. The Court faced a
classification regarding mental retardation in the
context of zoning laws in City of Cleburne v.
CleburneLiving Ctr.247 The Court only required
that the classification be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest but, nevertheless, held
the law unconstitutional. In reaching the conclusion 2" that the classification was only subject to
minimal scrutiny, the Court acknowledged that
the mentally retarded are immutably different.249
However, the Court but contended that lawmakers were addressing their problems, 250 evidencing that the group was not politically powerless."' The Court further indicated that the group
was too large and amorphous 2 2 to be deserving
of quasi-suspect classification. It would appear
that groups of people with mental or physical
handicaps, as well as carriers of defective genes,
have a similar profile. Therefore, unequal treat-
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ment of these groups would be reviewed only
for a rational basis.
Wealth is a defacto classification system
for the more advanced reproductive technologies
that are generally extremely expensive and not
funded by public assistance programs. Given that
there is no affirmative right to governmental services due to lack of state action,253 this economic
deviding line certainly is not violative of equal
protection. Fertility services covered under Medicaid are increasingly faced with political opposition.254 Allocation of public welfare funds, however, need only be rational.255
2. Equalprotection when a fundamental interestis burdened
Where a classification burdens a fundamental interest, it will be subject to strict scrutiny on equal protection grounds.256 For example,
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 57 where denial of welfare depended on a minimal one-year state residency. The Court found that such a classification burdened the fundamental interest to travel.
In such a situation, "any classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of that right 258 is
subject to strict scrutiny.
For strict scrutiny to be applied under the
theory of equal protection, there must be a fundamental interest and the classification must actually penalize the exercise of that interest.
While the fundamental interest must be of constitutional significance, it may differ from the
fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed by the
constitution. For example, there is no explicitly
guaranteed federal constitutional right to vote in
state elections, but classifications that burden the
fundamental interest in electoral representation
259
are subject to strict scrutiny.
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a. Penalizing the use of

rights. Where both equal protection and due proreproductive services
cess analyses have been applicable in such situArguably, the various classifications that ations, the Court has internally disagreed as to
263
are proposed may burden a fundamental interest the proper avenue of constitutional analysis.
in the right to procreate. A classification that di- In the present hypothetical, both substantive due
260
rectly penalizes the exercise of procreation
process and equal protection doctrines would
through assisted reproductive technologies would have the same result: a demand that the state dembe subject to such an analysis. It is doubtful a onstrate a compelling interest narrowly tailored
state would seek to penalize the exercise of pro- to the state's interests. However, these approaches
creation via new technologies without outright may differ somewhat. First, where a classificabanning the exercise, which would simply raise tion burdens a fundamental interest under the
the issue of the right to procreate, in supra sec- Equal Protection Clause, that interest need not
tion IV.A. before equal protection analysis would always rise to the level of one guaranteed by the
apply.
Due Process Clause.264 Second, the degree to
which the fundamental interest or right must be
b. Selectively denying the burdened may differ.265
use of reproductive services
Another possible scheme by which the
c. Unequalfundingof restate may express disfavor for the use of repro- productive services
ductive technologies by some groups is to reConceivably, a state may decline to fund
strict 26' both public and private access to such some reproductive activities, either through its
procedures for selected groups, such as unmar- public welfare system or by denying such fundried individuals. This would constitute a burden ing to public hospitals. By funding some groups
on the fundamental interest of procreation for but not others, a classification is made with regroups that cannot use those technologies to pro- spect to the affirmative grant of procreative sercreate. Therefore, the court should apply a strict vices. This type of burden probably does not jusscrutiny analysis. While "reasonable regulations" tify heightened scrutiny under an equal protecthat touch on a fundamental right may not be sus- tion analysis. The fundamental interest potenpect, where a classification "directly and substan- tially burdened for purposes of an equal protectially" touches on a fundamental right by deny- tion analysis is not procreation in general, but
ing access to a particular group, the regulation rather the interest in receiving governmental promust be supported by a compelling state inter- creative services.A fundamental interest is prob26 2
ably not involved where the activity that is burest.
An alternative way to analyze such a clas- dened is not the right to procreate itself (because
sification is to say that due process rights of the an individual can always go to his or her private
group denied or restricted access have been vio- physician266), but rather, the right to the funding
lated. This approach would not depend on the in order to procreate. Providing procreative ser267
classifications themselves, but rather, on the fact vices by the state is not a fundamental interest
that some people have been denied particular even though the right to procreate is a fundamen218 o Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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tal right implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.
State funding of reproductive services is
not a substantive due process right, as seen in
supra section IV.B., nor is funding a fundamental interest for the purposes of equal protection
analysis. The reason is that the right to procreate
is based on the right to privacy, which is integrally concerned with the "right to be left
alone.

26 8

V. State interest in reproductive
technology regulation
The state needs to set forth interests that
may range from compelling to simply rational
depending on the type of restrictions or classifications envisioned. 269 Stricter scrutiny requires
a tighter fit between the restriction and the legitimate governmental objectives. Several have
been proposed and are relevant to various situations. The following discussion highlights the
issues regarding some of the more controversial
asserted state interests. The discussion is not
meant to exclude other legitimate state interests
such as health, safety and consumer protection.27°

only a potential fetus, and, therefore, the state
interest would be an extension of the concept of
potential life. 274 Both concern for the fetus itself
and concern for the unconceived potential fetus
are concerns for potential life. 275 For purposes of
this discussion, this section will stress post-conception concerns. Infra sections V.B. and C. details with concerns about the potential pregnancy,
where the critical issue will obviously not deal
with the rights of the fetus itself, but rather, with
the eventual outcome of the pregnancy and the
appropriateness of the potential family arrangement.

1. Potential existence of the fetus as a state interest
One area of comparison in reference to
the interests of the fetus involves the abortion
cases. A state interest in the continued development of the fetus has been recognized in this line
of cases, and the state interest has even been held
to be compelling in the latter stages of pregnancy.
Therefore, after the point of viability, 27 6 the
woman's liberty interest in controlling her pregnancy can be trumped by the "interest of the State
in the protection of potential life." 277 Assisted
A. Fetal rights
reproductive technologies, however, are not in
A number of assisted reproductive tech- this age contemplated to involved "fetuses" afnologies processes manipulate the reproductive ter the point of viability. Therefore, for a comprocess well after fertilization. Since people parison to the abortion cases, the state interests
believe that life begins with fertilization, medi- in the early stages of pregnancy must be examcal manipulations that disturb a zygote, ined.278
preembryo or embryo 27 2 may be subject to limiBefore viability, the Court has recognized
tations in an effort to express the state's concern the woman's substantive due process right to
273
for the developing being.
elect to have an abortion and has indicated that
Where the intimate decision of a couple the state may not eliminate that choice altobefore or at the time of conception involves medi- gether.2 79 However, the Court has recognized that
cal technology, concern is also expressed on be- there is a legitimate state interest in potential life
half of the fetus. Of course, at that point, it is throughout the duration of the pregnancy. 28° In
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the final balance, the Court concluded that before viability the state could not unduly burden
the abortion decision.
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A
statute with this purpose is invalid because
the means chosen by the state to further the
interest in potential life must be calculated
to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it. A statute which, while furthering
the interest in potential life or some other
valid state interest, has the effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman's choice cannot be considered a
permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends. 8
Therefore, during the pre-viability phase of
pregnancy, the state interest in potential life is
not compelling enough to curtail a woman's right
to abortion, but the various regulations do not
require strict scrutiny. By implication, however,
the interest in the potentiality of life is a rational
one.
An Illinois district court applied the
analysis used in the abortion cases to an Illinois
law that could be construed to impinge upon
embryo transfer and chorionic villus sampling.
The court applied the lack of a compelling state
interest in pre-viability abortion to reproductive
technologies performed on a fetus which were
not therapeutic for the fetus. "Since there is no
compelling state interest sufficient to prevent a
woman from terminating her pregnancy during
the first trimester, there can be no such interest
sufficient to intrude upon these other protected
220 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

activities during the first trimester. 2 2
In comparing the issue of abortion with
the right to procreate implicated by reproductive
technologies, some differences should be highlighted. First, the individual's interest in having
an abortion is possibly greater than the
individual's interest in procreating. Because abortion involves both the right to determine whether
to procreate as well as the issue of bodily integrity. "The detriment the State would impose upon
283
the pregnant woman by denying this choice
of abortion involves both physical and psychological anguish 284 that is not as directly implicated in the denial of procreative services. To
the extent that artificial procreation could be construed to be less of a personal interest than abortion, the state interest may correspondingly be
viewed as more compelling, as it relates to artificial procreation.
Second, in the case of abortion, there are
no offspring; whereas in artificial procreation,
the aim is to create a child. Arguably, there is a
stronger interest in potential life when the goal
is to bring a life into existence.
The state's interest, with respect to the
potentiality of life, is the concern that some reproductive techniques may create a fetus 285 and
then place that fetus at risk for failure to implant. 286 Despite the possible differences from the
abortion cases, several factors imply that no compelling state interest in the potentiality of life in
the early stages of pregnancy exists where assisted reproductive technologies are utilized.
First, it is difficult to see how the potentiality of life could be compelling in comparison
with the choice of whether to have a child at all.
Because assisted reproductive technologies focus on positively reproducing, the state interest
in the potentiality of life when the state restricts
access to reproductive technologies is actually
Volume 8, number 3

an interest in the nonpotentiality of life. If the that impinge upon the post-conception entity can
state does not allow the manipulation of embryos have only one effect: refusing to allow that enwhere such techniques are necessary in the treat- tity to be created at all so that it will not face
ment of infertility, there will be no fetus at all. what is seen as unnatural manipulation by man.
Of course, one can argue that the outcome of the Some religions take this view288 for various moral
potential life may be a concern in some situa- reasons, such as the possibly unpalatable notion
tions, an issue more thoroughly discussed infra that physicians will be playing God. In general,
section V.B. Yet, the nonpotentiality of life ap- moral choices of the government can legitimately
parently must be a substantially weaker state in- supply a rational basis for legislation. 289 Howterest than the potentiality of life recognized in ever, a moral preference, without more, is insufthe abortion cases.
ficient to serve as a compelling state interest.29°
Second, an issue arises as to whether
placing the fetuses
2.
Potential injury
at risk can be
to the fetus as a
Some cases iden tify 'a state
comparable to the
right of a parent's
interest in poten tial life because
state interest
election to have an
When
abortion. Assisted
of possible iniur'y to the fetus.
concern about the
fetus is not that of
reproductive technologies may inpossible loss (for
volve a higher rate of loss than baseline, but abor- example, by failure to implant), as described
above, but of possible injury to the potential child,
tion involves a 100% loss.
Third, it is a natural process for the body the state may have a stronger interest. It should
to occasionally reject the conceptus. For example, be noted that there is no evidence to support the
only about half of the fertilized eggs resulting contention that children conceived through artifrom coitus ultimately manage to be born.287 The ficial reproductive technologies have any more
body, by spontaneous abortion and miscarriage, abnormalities than the baseline found in the geneffectively screens out the less viable fetuses eral population. 29' Therefore, this cannot be a
from becoming children. For the state to assert state interest.
that this fundamentally natural process is conHowever, reasons exist why a state intrary to public policy is a dubious claim. Even in terest may be important to address. First, adthe most optimal circumstances, when artificial vances in this field are rapid, and it is possible
means are not employed, the majority of fetuses that future procedures could put children condo not come to term. If the state's concern is that ceived through particular methods at risk. Secthe fetus should not be created if it will be sub- ond, some prenatal procedures may possibly be
jected to the possibility of loss, then no pregnan- correlated with deformities, albeit at very minicies could overcome this asserted state interest. mal levels.292 Although such procedures are not
Surely, this is inconsistent with the proper un- directly involved in assisted reproductive techderstanding of the right to procreate.
nologies, the legal arguments often compare such
Restrictions on reproductive technologies techniques to the technologies commonly uti1996
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lized.
Some cases identify a state interest in
potential life because of possible injury to the
fetus. These cases involve forced cesarean sections, criminal prosecution of mothers who use
drugs during pregnancy, state criminal laws protecting the interest of the fetus, and prenatal injuries in tort law.
Court-ordered cesareans have divided the
courts. Some courts have refused to balance state
interests against the individual at all, apparently
deciding there can be no compelling state interest in the fetus sufficient to allow such a gross
intrusion upon a woman's bodily integrity.
[The state] argued that the circuit court
should have balanced the rights of the unborn but viable fetus which was nearly at
full term and which, if the uncontradicted
expert testimony of the physicians had been
accurate, would have been born dead or severely retarded.... We hold today that Illinois courts should not engage in such a balancing, and that a woman's competent
choice in refusing medical treatment as
invasive as a cesarean section during her
pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful
to her fetus.293
Even when a state interest in the fetus is presented, prevailing arguments suggest the interest is not sufficiently compelling. 94
On the other hand, some courts have
forced women to undergo cesarean sections for
the benefit of their potential children. 95 However, in such cases, the state interest is that of a
post-viability fetus as recognized in the abortion
296
cases.
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The cesarean cases are illustrative of the
nature of the state interest in preventing fetal injury, but they can be distinguished on several
points. First, these cases, by their very nature,
all concern post-viability fetuses. Roe and its
progeny make clear that the state has a compelling interest in the fetus during this stage of pregnancy. Second, the personal right to avoid surgical intervention via cesarean is different than both
the choice to have an abortion or to use assisted
reproductive technologies. It is likely that a state
interest would need to be of greater significance
to allow the forced physical intrusion of a cesarean, as opposed to depriving a personal choice
regarding future procreation.
The rights of a fetus to be born without
defect or injury are contemplated by the criminal law. State laws that establish a duty to care
for children include in their scope a duty to care
for a "child conceived but not yet born." 2 97 Similarly, some states consider the killing of a fetus
to be equivalent to murder.2 98 However, in cases
where mothers have been charged with criminally administering cocaine to their babies in
utero, courts have traditionally held that criminal charges are not validly raised against the
mother for injuring her fetus by using drugs.299
These cases generally have been decided upon
statutory and policy grounds, without discussion
of constitutional implications.
Civil actions for injury to fetuses are allowed as well. When a fetus is born alive, there
is near universal recognition of a cause of action
for prenatally inflicted injuries.-'° Additionally,
numerous states do not recognize parental immunity,30 ' and the application of tort law to a
mother's actions during pregnancy is a theoretical possibility. However, civil actions filed by
an offspring against its mother for prenatal inju-
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ries have been recognized in only a limited number of jurisdictions.3 °2 When the court rejects
such a cause of action, the great discretion a
woman must be afforded over the control of her
own body is important in distinguishing her from
third parties as a tortfeasor. "Holding a mother
liable for the unintentional infliction of prenatal
injuries subjects to State scrutiny all the decisions a woman must make in attempting to carry
a pregnancy to term, and infringes on her right

to privacy and bodily autonomy.
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This variety of cases demonstrates the
tension between the state interest in protecting
the fetus and the intermingled mother/fetal interests. Clearly there is a state interest in the wellbeing of the fetus, but the cesarean cases show
that this interest is not sufficiently compelling in
some circumstances when the mother's constitutional interests are involved.
The importance of the state interest in the
fetus is necessarily mitigated when it pits the
parents' interests against that of the developing
fetus. This is illustrated by criminal and civil laws
that aim to protect the fetus from harm. The identity of the actor is often critical to the categorization of the action that affects the fetus: killing
a fetus is considered murder in some states, yet
abortion is exempted; harming another's fetus is
criminal, but prosecutions against mothers for
drug delivery through the umbilical cord typically fail; third parties can be sued for negligent
actions that harm a fetus, but few jurisdictions
recognize a cause of action against the mother
for the same. Courts have reached these results
for a variety of reasons: statutory interpretation
and the rule of lenity; public policy; and the right
to privacy.
Although the conclusions of criminal and
tort law could be altered by a command of the
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relevant legislature, current law in these areas is
suggestive of the level of state interests in the
fetus versus the interests of the individual who
would bring it into existence. It is certainly important that children brought into the world are
as healthy as possible. However, it is unlikely
that such an interest can be compelling against
the rights of those who create that very possibility. In rejecting an infant's cause of action against
its mother for a prenatal tort, the Illinois Supreme
Court reasoned that:
[liogic does not demand that a pregnant
woman be treated in a court of law as a
stranger to her developing fetus. It would
be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal person with rights hostile to and
assertable against its mother.... No other
plaintiff depends exclusively on any other
defendant for everything necessary for life
itself. No other defendant must go through
biological changes of the most profound
type, possibly at the risk of her own life, in
order to bring forth an adversary into the
world. 04
Such reasoning is equally applicable to assisted reproductive technologies, if it could be
shown that such techniques pose a risk to the
developing fetus. In both cases, it is an unrealistic assumption that the interests of the parents
are necessarily adverse to the fetus, because, in
both cases, the fetus exists only through the efforts of the parents. The idea of fetal rights directly conflicts with the parents' reproductive
autonomy. Therefore, it appears that potential
injury to the fetus from the use of reproductive
technologies is a rational state interest, but is not
compelling enough 3°5 to justify a restriction or
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classification where strict scrutiny is required.
B. Genetic defect (pre-conception injury)
Another possible reason to regulate assisted reproductive technologies is that some
patients, who are otherwise unable to reproduce
might be carriers of a genetic defect and, thus,
would pass on an "injury" to their offspring. For
example, reproductive technologies might be denied to parents who possess certain genetic defects that may be passed on to their offspring.
Initially, such a restriction would appear to be
subject to strict scrutiny because of its denial of
an individual's right to procreate,' there by creating a classification that burdens a fundamental
30 7
right.
The state interest in this situation is to
the
birth of genetically defective children.
avoid
One rationale for limiting procreation on this basis is described by Professor Shaw:
Since parents have control over their reproductive organs and can decide whether to
transmit their genes to their children, they
should be held accountable to their offspring
for causing misery, pain, suffering, and
death if it could have been avoided.... [Ilt
should be incumbent upon the law to control the spread of genes causing severe deleterious effects just as disabling pathogenic
bacteria and viruses are controlled. °8
Eugenic measures to optimize the genetic
profile of humans have been viewed by many as
both morally and constitutionally suspect.30 9
Additionally, eugenic measures are impractical
and the proscription of procreation by carriers
of defective genes 310 has never really been seri-
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ously contemplated by the medical community."
Regulating the procreative choices of fertile
couples would be haphazard and subject to abuse
by "evil and reckless hands."3 2 On the other
hand, infertile couples who seek medical assistance are a discrete group who can be easily regulated through channels whereby the government
typically oversees provisions of health care. The
question arises, then, as to whether the "handle"
that reproductive technologies provide the state
in its regulatory capacity can justify laws that
would, if applied to the general public, be seen
as unconscionable.
One problem with a state interest in the
potential child at the early state of pre-conception is that the state interest is too far removed in
time and causality to justify intrusive governmental regulation. The availability of a private cause
of action for pre-conception torts has a mixed
record in state courts.3 13 In the context of a Title
VII sex discrimination violation by a batterymanufacturing employer, the Supreme Court
concluded that such an interest in the fetus was
contextually unjustified. "No one can disregard
the possibility of injury to future children; the
[bona fide occupational qualification], however,
is not so broad that it transforms this deep social
concern into an essential aspect of
batterymaking. 314
The use of procreative technologies, in
situations when its use is considered expressive
of the right to procreate appears to have similar
characteristics. With respect to constitutional
rights, there is nothing less private about conception that occurs in a doctor's office as opposed to conception that occurs in a bedroom. 15
Although the "deep social concern" regarding
injury to a potential unconceived life is a rational basis for legislation, this concern is too far
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removed from individual choices in bearing or
begetting a child to justify state intervention. The
constitutional right to privacy does not disappear
in a doctor's office.316

The fact that infertile couples are politically more susceptible to state regulation is a reflection of the need for constitutional protection.
When a constitutional right is at stake, it must
not be deprived arbitrarily. Yet, restriction for the
reason of genetic defect is a grossly
underinclusive restriction. Fertile couples who
are carriers of severe genetic defects are not
prohibited from procreating, although screening
for various genetic indices is routinely proposed
for eligibility in assisted reproductive technologies programs.317
It is unclear what harm the state would
prevent by condoning an infertile couple access
to reproductive technologies. Although the possible perpetuation of the genetic defect would
be eliminated, the result would be at the risk of
the birth of a child. This paradox is the basis of
the states' rejection 318 of wrongful life319 claims
in tort law. For example, a Michigan court summarized the problems with a state interest as nonexisting over a handicapped birth due to a negligent action that resulted in life.
Many courts have echoed the rationale of
Becker 32° in refusing to recognize a legally
cognizable injury in being born impaired
rather than not being born at all. Under this
view, the tort is often perceived as contradictory to the belief that life is precious and
that life, even with a major handicap, is preferable to nonlife. Moreover, this view recognizes the difficulty of determining to what
deformities the tort should apply. Many
courts also follow the reasoning of
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.Gleitman321 and Becker with regard to the
impossibility of measuring damages in
terms of weighing the value of a defective
life against the value of no life at all.322
The same problem arises when attempting to
recognize a state interest in the nonexistence of
genetically defective children.
Classifications which incidentally touch
upon procreative rights, require only a rational
basis. For exaomple, reduction of medical expenses to care for handicapped children, or even
the bare moral judgment that they are better off
unborn. However, it is questionable whether such
desires could be compelling enough to restrict
an individual's right to procreate. The legal system "has no business declaring that among the
living are people who never should have been
born.-

323

Three states have reached a contrary position in tort law and have allowed damage
awards in wrongful life claims. The primary reason of New Jersey, 324 Washington, 325 and
California's 326 position is to ensure compensa-

tion 327 "notwithstanding [the courts'] apparent
agreement that the child has suffered no cognizable injury. ' 321 However, when a state interest
is asserted against an individual's right to procreate, the state is not acting to spread the cost
of damages at all. Rather, the state simply declaring that the child should not exist. This position seems to be squarely contrary to the recognized state interest in the sanctity of all life.329
Thus, it seems unlikely that the interest in avoiding perpetuation of undesirable genes which may
cause physical disabilities is compelling enough
to withstand strict scrutiny.
C. Family outcome and rights of thefuture child
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The proper family environment33 ° for a cate the relationship that most persons have with
'
potential child conceived from assisted reproduc- their natural parents during their entire lives."334
tive techniques is often asserted as a state inter- On the other hand, when the state's interest in
est justifying various restrictions and classifica- the child is asserted in determining who is cations of potential parents. The expression of this pable of procreating, the regulation is more akin
state interest would be to prevent the creation of to regulating natural families. No child yet eximproper family units through the use of artifi- ists when fertility treatments are contemplated.
cial means.
Generally, the state has similar powers
One possible area of comparison is the to manipulate natural families as its does in the
state interest in the best interests of the child who creation of adoptive families. Curiously, the best
is adopted. The state clearly has parens patriae interests of a child become a compelling state
authority to ensure the best interests of a child in interest only after a possible custody battle arises.
adoptive situations. "The State, of course, has a When the child does not yet exist, there is no
duty of the highest order to protect the interests analogous free-standing state interest in the poof minor children,
tential circumparticularly those
stances of that
Generally, the state has similar
of tender years....
child's life. "A
The goal of grantcouple has no
powers to manipulate natural
ing custody based
right to adopt a
on the best interfamilies as its does in the
child it is not
ests of the child is
equipped
to
creation of adoptive ones.
3
35
indisputably a subrear,"
but it
stantial governdoes have rights
mental interest for purposes of the Equal Protec- to procreate and raise children.336 Thus, so long
tion Clause. ' 33 1 This state interest is of a suffi- as the care of a child meets minimal standards, a
ciently compelling degree to justify racial con- state may not arbitrarily determine that the child's
siderations as one (although not decisive) factor best interests lie in removing her from her present
in adoption decisions.332 Similarly, in foster care home.
placement, a "child's racial and cultural needs..
Another area where the state has asserted
. that [are] consistent with the best interest of the its interest in a particular family arrangement
child, [are] indisputably a compelling govern- arises in dealing with illegitimate children. In
mental interest for the purposes of the Equal Pro- considering the financial obligations to illegitimate children, the Court has acknowledged "the
tection Clause. 333
Although undisputed in adoption and fos- State's interest in protecting 'legitimate family
ter care, the parens patriae role of government relationships,' and the regulation and protection
does not form a sufficient basis for a state inter- of the family unit. ' 337 The state may have an
est in regulating assisted reproductive technolo- interest in structuring financial obligations to acgies. In adoption, the specific context of a child's knowledge its preference for children raised in
interests can be weighed. It is "the goal to dupli- families with married parents.
This interest enunciated in the illegitimate
226 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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children cases fails to apply to children conceived
through assisted reproductive technologies. First,
this state interest is clearly limited to discouraging the behavior of the parent, not the existence
of the child.
[W]e have unambiguously concluded that
a State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order to express its
disapproval of their parents' misconduct..
. . "The Court recognized in Weber that visiting condemnation upon the child in order
to express society's disapproval of the parents' liaisons 'is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well
as an unjust-way of deterring the parent. '338
It may appear that regulating reproductive technologies is directed at parents, but such
reasoning is faulty. The state does not protect the
unitary family by preventing the formation of any
family. In this scenario, the state is actually imposing a disability on the child by denying the
child life if he or she has the wrong type of parents. This position is not a legitimate state interest in either the illegitimacy cases or in the area
of reproductive technologies.
Second, if the state desires to encourage
a particular family organization (e.g. marriage
before procreation) by denying the right to procreate to those who do not comply, this rationale
directly conflicts with Eisenstadt and its prog-
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eny. Those cases guarantee the right to procreate
to both married and single individuals and, by
implication, do not permit such distinctions by
themselves to be used to defeat the right to procreate.
Third, when classifications touching
upon the legitimacy of a child were upheld, these
classifications dealt with state social and economic policies which recognized certain types
of relationships as being preferable. The classifications did not interfere with the ultimate existence of the child itself. The placement of restrictions on reproductive technologies by the
state due to a state concern about the potential
family arrangement almost always will fail to be
narrowly tailored to the state interest. Less restrictive means are clearly available. For example, the state could provide childcare assistance and education programs for the potential
parents. Furthermore, most restrictions are likely
to be overinclusive because many individuals
with good parenting skills may fail to meet a
particular classification. Similarly, restrictions
may be underinclusive because individuals with
poor parenting skills may still fall within desirable profiles, such as married, noncriminal, psychologically stable, etc. may still be those.
Another set of cases, which establish the
right to privacy encompass the right to family
relations. These cases suggest that the state's
imposition of a particular family arrangement as
a state interest is not a legitimate purpose, either
on a compelling or rational level. When only a
rational basis is required, "it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is
not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality.'" 339 However, a state interest that itself offends the constitution is not a legitimate one.'
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Most family rights cases discuss the burden state regulations pose on the freedom to form
" ' For example, in a
family arrangements.34
case
where a putative father wanted to set aside an
adoption of his child, the Court stated that "[i]n
recognition of the role of [the institution of marriage], and as part of their overarching concern
for serving the best interests of children, state
laws almost universally express an appropriate
' The Court
preference for the formal family."342
decided the federal constitution did not protect
the putative father who had never had established
a substantial relationship with his child. When
the Court finds that a particular family arrangement is not protected by the right to privacy, it is
free to weigh the benefits of one type of family
over another family arragement in shaping public policy.3 43
However, if the state wishes to express
its interests in the family, contravening the use
of reproductive technologies, the state converts
its interest in the family from a shield (from governmental intrusion) into a sword which justifies abridgment of other rights. Because the promotion of one type of family may undermine the
recognition of other family living arrangements,
such expressed concern for family should be
viewed carefully. Where the government acts to
modify the legal entitlements surrounding various family arrangements, it is allowed to do so
in cases where the government does not "[seek]
to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling." 344 However, "the choice of relatives in this degree of
kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the State .... [T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.""
Therefore, while the traditional under228 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

standing of the family may determine what protections the Due Process Clause offers,34 the state
may not impose its conception of the appropraite
family unit to undermine other legitimate constitutional rights. The state may have legitimate
interests which are intertwined with the function
of the family. Yet, without more, a bare interest
in particular family arrangements is illegitimate.
Although the ordinance was supported by
state interests other than the State's interest
in substituting its conception of family life
for the family's own view, the ordinance's
relation to those state interests was too
"tenuous" to satisfy constitutional standards. By implication, a state interest in
standardizing its children and adults, making the "private realm of family life" conform to some state-designated ideal, is not
a legitimate state interest at all.347
The state's interest in a particular type of
family is an illegitimate state goal and,
therefore, it cannot serve either a compelling or rational basis for legislation that impinges on procreative rights.
Independent of the state's interest in particular types of families is the underlying concern that certain family situations may actually
be detrimental to a child's well-being. Theparens
patrite role of the state does not apply to potential offspring 348 and is not tailored narrowly
enough to serve a compelling state interest
against the right to procreate. 349 However, there
may be some evidence that certain types of family situations are healthier than others for children.35° Therefore, while the preference for one
type of family over another cannot serve as a
rational reason for a regulation, optimization of
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control, it does not justify the invasion of the constitutional rights of those who unfortunately are
infertile. It seems extreme to question the choice
of any two people to have a child. Yet, when a
couple arrives at a fertility clinic, their parenting
abilities are often scrutinized by doctors, hospiConclusion
In many social and ethical respects, natu- tal administrators and legislators. State interferral and artificial reproduction are similar because ence with procreation immediately raises questhey both fulfill the desire of parenthood and they tions reaching a constitutional dimension. The
both have the potential to burden children and use of a doctor, petri dish or other technology in
society with the prospect of sub-optimal fami- the process of reproduction should not render it
lies. The difference between the two types of re- any less of a fundamental right.
production is not primarily moral-it is political. The medical procedures necessary to carry
out reproductive technologies render such assistance more vulnerable to state intervention as
compared to reproduction conducted in the bedroom. While the ease of regulation may explain
the vulnerability of assisted reproduction to state
the family environment can be an acceptable goal
when the desire to protect children is a legitimate one that is not simply "a bare.., desire to
harm a politically unpopular group."35 '
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coverage for uterine embryo lavage, embryo transfer, artifiown guidelines describe infertility as an "illness"); Reilly v.
cial insemination, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, zygote
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisconsin, 846 F.2d 416 (7th
intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal ovum transfer).
Cir. 1988) (procedure is not experimental). Holding that reproductive technologies were not covered: Thomas v. Truck
"MD. CODE ANN. INS. §§ 354DD, 470W & 477EE (1994) (appliDrivers & Helpers Local No. 355, 771 E Supp. 714 (D. Md.
cable to insurance plans which provide pregnancy-related
1991) (vasoepididymostomy not covered; plan did not cover
benefits).
infertility treatments). Holding that ERISA preempted state
51TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.51 -6(3A) (West 1993) (applicable to
claims: Maciosek v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisconsin,
insurance plans which provide pregnancy-related benefits).
930 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1991) (IVF not covered; failure to plead
ERISA claims); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.
52 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 1994) (health
89-1054 (D. Ariz. June 4, 1990) (IVF not covered; infertility
10119.6
&
11512.28
INS.
CODE
§§
plans);
CAL.
care service
was pre-existing condition).
(WEST 1994).
53
6342 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. Discrimination in public accommoMASS. ANN. LAws chs. 175 § 47H, 176B & 4J (Law. Co-op.
dations, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1993), is prohibited in a "pro1995) (applicable to insurance plans which provide pregfessional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
nancy-related benefits).
service establishment," id. § 12181(7)(F). State hospitals are
14 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23 & 27-20-20 (1994) (apalso covered, id. § 121311()(b), by a ban on discrimination in
plicable only to married individuals and insurance plans which
services by a public entity, id. § 12132. The Rehabilitation
provide pregnancy-related benefits).
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1993), may also apply to state hospi55
tals that receive federal funding, id. § 794(b)(I )(A). The reMONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102 (l)(h)(v) (1995) (definitions);
strictions of the Rehabilitation Act are substantially the same
id. § 33-31-202 (l)(b).
as theADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (enforcement); id. § 12134(b)
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I

(regulations).
942 U.S.C. § 12102(2); H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. at 52 (1990).
o It has been argued that the ADA requirements may affirmatively mandate coverage of fertility treatments when any
health services are provided by the government. When it was
suggested that the Oregon Health Plan drop fertility treatment from its list of services, "[flederal attorneys maintain[ed]
that not to include some form of treatment would violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Fertility problems are classified as disabilities under federal law." Ore. FertilityFunding for Welfare Recipients Called 'JustInsane,' SEATTLE TMEs,
April 18, 1994, at B3. See generally David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 271 JAMA
308 (1994).
'Arguable exceptions to coverage under theADA might include:
I) defining the fertility service as requiring good parenting
skills such that the "criteria can be shown to be necessary for
the provision of the goods, services, facilities,... or accommodations being offered", 42 U.S.C. § 122 10(b), or 2) construing the threat to the potential child, see infra sections V.A
to .B, as a "direct threat to the health or safety of others," 42
U.S.C. § 12182(3).
72858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. I11.1994).
7 Cf. McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir.
1992) (Rehabilitation Act).
741995 WL 16777, at *2-3 (E.D. La.).
71By comparison, limitations on insurance coverage for HIV+

individuals was determined to violate theADA, but an exclusion for mental illness has not. Orentlicher, supra note 70, at
310. The ADA, of course, does not obligate health care providers to treat all ailments, and past case law regarding the
Rehabilitation Act suggests that excluding particular treatments from coverage by a state program is not discrimination if the limitations are applied uniformly. Id. at 309 (citing
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
76

See infra section V.C.

77U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The Due Process Clause applies

to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
78381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79Id. at 484.
"'Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
11Id. at 482.
82405 U.S. 438 (1972).
3

8 U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § I.

89316 U.S. 535 (1942).
901d. at 541.
91Id.

92 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
3
9 Carey, 431 U.S. at 687.
'"Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
'5Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
""Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
-7491 U.S. 110(1989).
9"Id. at 123.
99 (The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society,
which we have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is typified,
of course, by the marital family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children. Perhaps the concept can be expanded even beyond this, but it will bear no
resemblance to traditionally respected relationships-and will,
thus, cease to have any constitutional significance-if it is
stretched so far as to include the relationship established between a married woman, her lover, and their child, during a
3-month sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a subsequent 8month period when, the loser stayed with the married woman
and the child [as is the situation in the present case] since he
happened to be in Los Angeles.).
Id. See also id. at 123 n.3
"ld. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia, in writing the plurality opinion, explains his
methodology for examining substantive due process claims
in his discussion in footnote 6. Id. at 127 n.6. The plurality
opinion was joined by four justices, but two (O'Connor and
Kennedy) specifically declined to join in footnote 6, id. at
132 (O'Connor, J., concurring), leaving the footnote 6 analysis supported only by Rehnquist.

101

"'°Id.at 127 n.6.
3
1' 1d. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
329 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976)).
"'°United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,756 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
" U.S. CONST. amend IV.

14405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).

' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).

8 431 U.S. 678 (1977).

"John

mId. at 687.
Ild. at 684-85 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973)) (citations omitted).
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A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405,
406 (1983).As noted by Professor John Robertson, "[flreedom
to have sex without reproduction does not guarantee freedom
to have reproduction without sex."
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"09Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
"0Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
1 John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL.
L. REV. 942,962 n.70 (1986).
12478 U.S. 186 (1986).
"31d. at 191.
4Id. The references to Carey are to footnotes 5 and 17, 431 U.S.
678, 688 n.5, 694 n. 17 (1977), as further elaborated infra in
this discussion.
15 Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977) (citations omitted).
"61d. at 685.
"" Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
" 8 [T]he intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential
and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but which always
and in every age it has fostered and protected. It is one thing
when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital
sexuality [altogether,] or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of
the criminal law the details of that intimacy.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Accord Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F Supp. 729
(N.D. Tex. 1970); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1968).
"9 "Finally, it should be said of the Court's holding today that it
in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual
promiscuity or misconduct." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
'"Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 n.7.
I2Id. at 447.
22

1

1d. at 448.
(Appellant insists that the unmarried have no right to engage
in sexual intercourse and hence no health interest in contraception that needs to be served. The short answer to this contention is that the same devices the distribution of which the
State purports to regulate when their asserted purpose is to
forestall pregnancy are available without any controls whatsoever so long as their asserted purpose is to prevent the spread
of disease.)
Cf. id. at 451 n.8

'23Id. at 447 n.7; Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5.
224 The question was not decided in Bowers. "The only claim
properly before the Court, therefore, is Hardwick's challenge
to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual
sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of
the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy." 478
U.S. at 188 n.2.
25
1 Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176 (Ct. App. Md. 1990). State v.
Poe, 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1980); Compare State v. Pilcher,
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242 NW2d 348 (Iowa 1976); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d
936, 940-41 (N.Y. 1980); with State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58,
68 (R.I. 1980); 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976); Dixon v.
State, 268 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. 1971); Post v. State, 715 P.2d
1105, 1107, 1109 (Okla. Crim.App. 1986);
2603 F.Supp. 960 (E.D. Wash. 1985), vacated on other grounds,
782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986).
27
1d. at 966-67.
' 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
'191d. at 386.
'°Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. Wash. 1974) (Petition
for rehearing denied July 18, 1974. Review denied by Supreme Court of Washington October 10, 1974.)
31
1 Id. at 1195.
3
' 1The right for two married people to procreate is not contested.
[T]he Supreme Court has recognized a married couple's right
to procreate in language broad enough to encompass coital,
and most noncoital, forms of reproduction. In Meyer v. Nebraska, for example, the Court stated that constitutional liberty included the right of an individual 'to marry, establish a
home and bring up children.'
Robertson,Embryos, supra note 11l, at 958. In striking down
a mandatory sterilization law for habitual criminals in Skinner v.Oklahoma, the Court noted that the law interfered with
marriage and procreation, which were among 'the basic civil
rights of man.' In Stanley v. Illinois the Court observed that
'[t]he rights to conceive and raise one's children have been
deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and '[nlights
far more precious.., than property rights." The Court has
noted [in LaFleur] that 'freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Id.
'31 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
1-414 U.S. 632 (1974).
35
1 Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
136Griswold,

381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).

'"Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
1"Id. at 447.
39
1 1d. at 447 n.7.
I4° ld. at 449.
141
id. at 453.
142 Carey, 431 U.S. 686.
43

1

Id. at 686-87.

'"Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
141 Section IV.A.3., supra, deals with the question of whether the
marital unit is a necessary basis of substantive due process
rights in procreation. As it is generally not contested that a
number of cases imply a"positive right" for married persons
to procreate, see Robertson, Embryos, supra I I I note, at 958.
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The discussion in the present section concentrates on single
parents.
' This should not be confused with the affirmative obligation of
the government to provide assistance. Rather, the question at
hand is simply whether there is a protected privacy interest in
becoming pregnant at all.
147 See, e.g., Ann M. Massie, Restricting Surrogacy
to Married
Couples: A Constitutional Problem? The Married-Parent
Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (199 1).
'"The discussion in sections IV.A. 1. & 2. focused primarily on
whether the right to natural sexual procreation extends to new
reproductive technologies.The present discussion of the "positive" construction of procreative rights concerns whether there
is a right to affirmatively procreate at all, by coitus or by any
reproductive technology.
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 108, at
416. John A. Robertson described this argument in that
"[d]enying a couple the freedom to avoid procreation imposes
on the woman the physical burdens of bearing and giving
birth, while denying them the freedom to procreate prevents
them from having a certain experience." Professor Robertson
describes this argument in more detail:
The argument for a single person's right to procreate sexually must be distinguished from the argument for the right of
a single person to have sex with consenting others and the
right to avoid procreation. Recognition of the unmarried
person's right to avoid procreation through access to birth
control and abortion does not necessarily imply either a right
to procreate or a right to have sex with consenting others....
The single person's right to use contraception and to continue a pregnancy once begun does not necessarily entail a
right to conceive in the first place. Preventing conception and
pregnancy by requiring contraception and abortion interferes
with bodily integrity in a way that preventing conception in
the first place-by preventing access to the needed meansdoes not.
John A. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 11l, at 962 n.70,
963.
'-'Massie, supra note 147, at 502. ProfessorAnn M. Massie takes
this position, arguing that cases such as Eisenstadt only "concern protection of the right not to procreate, rather than of
any rights to conceive, bear, or nurture children."
's'

Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 108, at 418-20.
e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195.

52See,

... Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
'- f a narrower ground were available, it would be expected that
the Court would reach a decision on that ground. "The Court
will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."'
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. &
Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885)).
"5Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 108, at 418.
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112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
' 57The recognition of "marriage, procreation and contraception"
in the dissent, see infra note, presumably refers to the list of
aspects of due process repeatedly cited in the abortion cases,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,312 n. 18 (1980); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), which cite Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942), for the proposition that there is a right
to procreation. Skinner was a case about sterilization and,
hence, the positive right to procreation.
16

"'"Unlike marriage, procreation and contraception, abortion 'involves the purposeful termination of potential life."' Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159491 U.S. at 121.
6478 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added). Notably, the decision cites
and uses language from Carey, which borrows the "bear or
beget" phrase from Eisenstadt. In adapting the language from
Eisenstadt, the phrase in italics replaced the word "whether"
with "whether or not", implying a positive right.
161Carey, 431 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added).
162Skinner,

316 U.S. at 541.

163Id.

1- 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
65

Id. at 640 (citations omitted).

"6CompareDavis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), a case
where a divorced couple disagreed as to the disposition of
their frozen in vitro fertilized embryos. The court decided
upon a complex balancing approach in light of the positive
and negative aspects of procreative liberty. It stated that "whatever its ultimate [state and federal] constitutional boundaries,
the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights
of equal significance-the right to procreate and the fight to
avoid procreation." Id. at 601.
67
1 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Il. 1990).
'681d. at 1377.
"6Cameron v. Board of Educ. of the Hillsboro, Ohio, City Sch.
Dist., 795 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. Ohio 1991). Cf. the case of
In re Baby M., where a lower state court upheld a surrogate
pregnancy arrangement because it allowed a couple to exercise their fight to procreate. 525 A.2d 1128, 1164 (Super. Ct.
N.J. 1987). On review, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ultimately holding the
surrogacy arrangement null as contrary to public policy. On
the point of the right to procreation, the court did acknowledge a positive right to reproduction, in stating that "[tihe
right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural children, whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination." 537A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988). However, that right
was not enough to sustain the surrogacy arrangement because
introduction of a third party raised questions of custody and
the procreative fights of the surrogate mother. Id. at 1254.
7
°The interpretation of the marital unit as the ultimate basis of
substantive due process rights in procreation is discussed
supra section IV.A.3.
'

Massie, supra note 147, at 510.
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"'Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122-23 (plurality opinion).
'7 Substantive rights guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause are
not limited by the literal language of the Constitution nor historical practices. "It is also tempting ... to suppose that the
Due Process Clause protects only those practices defined at
the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
may not enter.... Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific
practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of liberty which the FourteenthAmendment protects."
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992).
"'74Massie, supra note 147, at 510 n. 132.
"7

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (Scalia, J., joined only by
Rehnquist, J. in this footnote).

176 1d. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring, with whom Kennedy, J.
joins) ("I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior
imposition of a single mode of historical analysis."); Id. at
133 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[E]nduring
'family' relationships may develop in unconventional settings."); Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting, with whom
Marshall, J.and Blackmun, J.join) ("[Tihe plurality opinion's
exclusively historical analysis portends a significant and unfortunate departure from our prior cases and from sound constitutional decisionmaking."); Id. at 162 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Wihatever stigma [of illegitimacy] remains in today's
society is far less compelling ... in this world of divorce and
remarriage.").
"7'Bowers,478 U.S. at 191.
"8Massie, supra note 147, at 509 n. 127.
'79Bowers,

478 U.S. at 196.

8 7

" See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

I'l Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-90.
2

'
8

See Massie, supra note, at 510.

' 3Cf. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 (1986) ("[W]e have
unambiguously concluded that a State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order to express its
disapproval of their parents' misconduct.").
"4Carey, 431 U.S. at 684.
185Id. at 687.
' Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 108, at 409-10.
See alsoRuth Macklin,ArtificialMeans of Reproductionand
Our Understandingof the Family,21 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
5(1991).
8

'

TSee Table 4 infra p. 210.
The division of the female reproductive role in gestational
surrogacy points up the three discrete aspects of motherhood:
genetic, gestational and social. The woman who contributes
the egg that becomes the fetus has played the genetic role of
motherhood; the gestational aspect is provided by the woman
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who carries the fetus to term and gives birth to the child; and
the woman who ultimately raises the child and assumes the
responsibilities of parenthood is the child's social mother.
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 791 (Cal. 1993).
The genetic mother, denied unfettered control of frozen embryos, "would have a reasonable opportunity, through IVF,
to try once again to achieve parenthood in all its aspectsgenetic, gestational, bearing, and rearing." Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
89
1 Id.
'90 As described supra section IV.A.4.
842 S.W.2d at 602.
1 1d. at 603.
193 Citing lack of fetal protection for wrongful death and homicide and the adoption of the trimester scheme for abortion.
See id. at 602.
94
1 "[T]he rule does not contemplate the creation of an automatic
veto." Id. at 604.
195The preference of both genetic parents are first examined.
If
they conflict or are unascertainable, prior agreement is used.
Absent a prior agreement, relative interests of the parties are
examined, with a preference toward the party wishing to avoid
procreation, assuming that the other party can reasonably
expect to achieve parenthood by other means. Id.
191

92

'9851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
Compare Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ct. App.
Ariz. 1994), holding unconstitutional, on equal protection
grounds, a statute that classified the gestational mother as the
legal mother. While fathers have an opportunity to prove paternity by genetic testing, this statute prevented genetic mothers from doing so. But see In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
893, 896 n.8 (Ct. App. 1994)("[Iln cases directly involving
human reproduction, individuals of different sexes may be
distinguished on the basis of different reproductive roles.").
198851 P.2d at 787.
'99Id. at 786.
2

"In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900.

201Id.

202608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
203851 P.2d at 782 n. 10 ("Thus, under our analysis, in a true 'egg

donation' situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth
to a child formed from the egg of another woman with the
intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the
natural mother under California law.").
204608 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
205644 N.E.2d

760 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1994).

20

6Id. at 764.

1 [Tlhere is abundant precedent for using the genetics test for
identifying a natural parent. For the best interest of the child
and society, there are strong arguments to recognize the genetic parent as the natural parent.The genetic parent can guide
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the child from experience through the strengths and weaknesses of a common ancestry of genetic traits. Because that
test has served so well, it should remain the primary test for
determining the natural parent, or parents, in nongenetic-providing surrogacy cases.
Id. at 766.
20$If the genetic providers have not waived their rights and have
decided to raise the child, then they must be recognized as
the natural and legal parents. By formulating the law in this
manner, both tests, genetics and birth, are used in determining parentage. However, they are no longer equal. The birth
test becomes subordinate and secondary to genetics.
Id. at 765.
209See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[E]nduring 'family' relationships may develop in unconventional settings.").
210491 U.S. 110 (1989).
2

at 123.
Id. at 123 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501).
2
11114 S. Ct. 1 (1993) (denial of stay).
24
1 1d. "Neither Iowa law, Michigan law, nor federal law authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child whose
natural parents have not been found to be unfit simply because they may be better able to provide for her future and
her education."
2"In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649,663-64 (Mich. 1993).
216Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 108, at 409-10.
1Id.

22

2
11Palko

v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
D.C. CODE Ann. § 16-402 (1994) (surrogacy arrangements prohibited and void); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05
(1995) (surrogacy arrangements unenforceable); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-159 (Michie 1995) (surrogacy arrangement allowed
when approved by court); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West
1994) (gestational surrogacy allowed and enforceable).
2'9 See, e.g., Marjorie Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intention-based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wisc. L. REV. 297 (1990); CARMEN SHALEV, BITH
21

8 See, e.g.,

POWER: THE CASE

FOR SURROGACY

(1989); KatharineT. Bartlett,

Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Scott
B. Rae, Parental Rights and the Definition of Motherhood in
Surrogate Motherhood, 3 S.

CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD-

219 (1994); Susan Ferguson, Surrogacy Contracts in the
1990s: The Controversy and Debate Continues, 33 DUQ. L.
REV. 903 (1995); EXPECTING TROUBLE: SURROGACY, FETAL
ABUSE, & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (Patricia Boling,
ed. 1995). See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
220[The state] has a legitimate interest in preventing the mercenary trafficking in babies, i.e., rent-a-womb services and the
buying and selling of eggs. It also has a legitimate concern to
avoid the emotional disruption in the gestational mother likely
to result from taking the child from her (e.g., Mary Beth
Whitehead), as well as the child's denigration as an object of
IES
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profit. These constitute compelling reasons in principle why
regulation or prohibition in this area may be appropriate.
Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361 (Gerber, J., concurring).
221DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489

U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
U.S. 464 (1977).

222432

223410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22
4Maher, 432 U.S. at 475.

225448 U.S. 297 (1980).
226

Id. at 317-18.

227

Cf. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.

§ 1. This applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
V.Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)
(The Supreme "Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
229
As discussed in section IV.C. 1.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

23

As discussed in section IV.C.2.

23

San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).

232City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
23 3

(1985).
Id.

234

Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
235Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
236There may also be a disparate impact upon women. Reproductive dysfunction appears more common in women, THE
MERCK MANUAL 1768 (16th ed. 1992), but male or interactive
factors in infertility account for at least 20% of cases, Shane,
supra note I, at 2 1. It also has been argued that restrictions
on certain types of arrangements may be discriminatory
against men. For example, prohibition of surrogacy arrangements may disproportionately prevent men from exercising
their procreative potential. Note, Reproductive Technology
and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 669, 680 n.67 (1985).
, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). But see Bray v.
Alexander Women's Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 789 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Geduldig, of course, did not purport to establish that, as a matter of logic, a classification
based on pregnancy is gender neutral.... Nor should Geduldig
be understood as holding that, as a matter of law, pregnancybased classifications never violate the Equal Protection
Clause."); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC,
462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983) (pregnancy-based classifications
are sex discrimination under Title VII in light of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977) (reasoning of
Geduldig does not allow active deprivation of an employment opportunity); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984) (criticizing Geduldig).
220

MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 131 (plurality opinion).
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For the legal system to apply heightened scrutiny to a classification not already recognized by case law, a group must have
certain characteristics. The Court explained that "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The test for heightened
scrutiny was outlined as follows:
To be a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, [a group] must 1)
have suffered a history of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them
as a discrete group; and 3) show that they are a minority or
politically powerless, or alternatively show that the statutory
classification at issue burdens a fundamental right.
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 E2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court has been reluctant to acknowledge the existence of new suspect or quasisuspect classes in recent decades.
[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has
the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our
respect for separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those
interests should be pursued.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42. Therefore, the suggestion that
a group heretofore not recognized as quasi-suspect be considered as such should been taken with some caution.

2

High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573-74.
241Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (using rational
basis review to strike down regulation but reserving question
of whether homosexuals would qualify as a quasi-suspect
class); Buttino v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 801 F Supp.
298 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Jantz v. Muci, 976 E2d 623 (10th Cir.
1992) (assuming rational basis review for determination of
qualified immunity); High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
But see Watkins v. Army, 847 E2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and decided on diff't grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989); Woodward v. Gallagher, 1992 WL 252279 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 1992) (advocating quasi-suspect classification but deciding on different grounds).
4
1 1 Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986); cf. Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47 (1977).
243 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Section
IV.C.2. shows that when a classification burdens a fundamental interest, it will be subject to heightened scrutiny under
equal protection analysis. Whereas the discussion in section
IV.C.2. focuses on procreative liberty as a fundamental interest that is burdened, the analysis follows with equal force
when an interest such as marriage is burdened.While the Court
in Zablocki did "not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny", id.
at 387, the state cannot constitutionally "interfere directly and
substantially with the right to marry", id., without a compel"

1996

ling state interest.
But see Quigley, supra note 15 ("The level of success achieved
by Sauer and colleagues in the women aged 40 years and
above receiving donated oocytes (33.7% anticipated live births
per transfer) suggests that the success of the procedure is independent of the age of the recipient."); Sauer, supranote 44
("No age-related decline in fertility was demonstrable when
oocyte donation was used, with a mean age of 44.3 ± 3.1
years for those successfully conceiving (range, 40 to 52 years).
...[W]omen of advanced reproductive age may conceive,
carry, and give birth to infants with success rates similar to
those of their younger counterparts using assisted reproductive methods.").
24' Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976).
246See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization of
feeble minded in state institutions upheld, but this case is not
considered good law in light of Skinner).
247473 U.S. 432 (1985).
24
8The court followed the analytic framework described in United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938),
which suggested that more exacting judicial scrutiny be exerted where there is discrimination against discrete and insular minorities, because in such situations the political process
cannot be expected to cause the repeal of undesirable legislation.
249 473 U.S. at 442.
24

2

50Id. at 443-44.

251Id. at 445.
252

Id. at 445-46.

253See supra section
25 4

IV.B.

See Ore. FertilityFundingfor Welfare Recipients Called 'Just
Insane', SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994.
255
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
' In Cleburne, the Court declared that strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause is required "when state laws impinge
on personal rights protected by the Constitution." 473 U.S. at
440. See also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Police Dep't. of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (right to demonstrate).
7
- 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
258
1d. at 634.
259

Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The level of constitutional significance to which the fundamental interest must
rise to obtain strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
is the subject of some controversy on the Court. If a classification deprives a group of fundamental rights under the constitution, it is simply a question of striking down the law as
violative of that provision in the constitution or under the
Due Process Clause. However, the Equal Protection Clause
grants strict or heightened scrutiny analysis to classifications
that burden fundamental interests which may not, by themselves, operate to obligate the government to respect such a
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right. For example, there is no constitutional right to an education, but when a classification unequally deprives that fundamental interest, it was subject to heightened scrutiny. Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). But see San Antonio Ind. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which argued that "[i]t
is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education
is 'fundamental' is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether
education is as important as the right to travel [that was recognized in Shapiro]. Rather, the answer lies in assessing
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." However, Rodriguez has
been characterized, in light of Plyler,as "a constitutional relic
[which is] as doctrine... irrelevant." Dennis J.Hutchinson,
More Substantive Equal Protection?ANote onPlyler v. Doe,
1982 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 19 1.
2

"Such a penalty could hypothetically be, for example, the denial of all public welfare assistance to an individual who decides to use assisted reproductive technologies. This is the
hypothetical example in Maher, 432 U.S. at 474, regarding
the right to abortion, that the court describes as analogous to
Shapiro in the imposition of a penalty on a fundamental interest.
26 Both a prohibition for a particular group, or a "direct and substantial" barrier, see supranote 243, at 387, would constitute
a restriction for purposes of this discussion.
262

Id.

e.g., id. at 391-92. Justice Stewart, concurring, disagreed
with the majority's approach of invalidating a restriction on
marriage because it unequally impinged on a fundamental
interest. Instead, he suggested that the substantive due process right to marriage was unconstitutionally impinged. He
argued that the Court misunderstood the issue presented:
[The Court] misconceive[s] the meaning of that constitutional
guarantee [of equal protection]. The Equal Protection Clause
deals not with substantive rights or freedoms but with invidiously discriminatory classifications.... Like almost any law,
the Wisconsin statute now before us affects some people and
does not affect others.... The problem in this case is not one
of discriminatory classifications, but of unwarranted encroachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom.

263See,

267

Cf supra section IV.B.

26Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 n.10 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557,564 (1969)). Unlike the fundamental interests
recognized in the areas of voting and education, where the
affirmative provision by government requires equal distribution except when contrary to acompelling state interest, voting and education largely serve their purposes by government
sponsored participation.
269 See supra section IV.
27
1See ROBERT

H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 62-65 (1990);
GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW, FERTILITY & REPRODUCTION 113-16

(1991) (consumer protection concerns).
I.

271See supra section
272

The terminology for the conceptus varies during development.
A zygote is the one-celled entity after fertilization. After cell
division, it is referred to as a pre-embryo until about 14 days
after fertilization. After that, it is referred to as an embryo An
embryo is not a fetus until several weeks later. See, e.g., Davis
v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-94 (Tenn. 1992), for a discussion of the different terms and their possible legal relevance.
For purposes of the present discussion, however, the asserted
fetal rights regard the state's interest in protecting the conceptus from the moment of fertilization.
273
Cf Sherman Elias, Social Policy Considerationsin Noncoital
Reproduction, 255 JAMA 62 (1986) (Table 1) (comparing
the interest in protecting the embryo in a variety of assisted
reproductive techniques).
4
27
See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
275Cf Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (the unborn are not "person[s]" for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment).
276
,"[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman." Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2816.
277

1d. at 2817.

27

1

Id.
264See, e.g., Kramer,395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting); Plyler v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202 (1982) (education).
Compare Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992) (substantive
due process right to abortion required strict scrutiny for regulations that were "undue burdens") with Zablocki, 434 U.S.
374, 387 (1978) (equal protection issue regarding fundamental interest in marriage required strict scrutiny for classifications that were "direct and substantial" interferences).
2' This, of course, may be a fiction for some individuals who
cannot afford private fertility treatment. However, for purposes of constitutional analysis, that does not rise to the level
of a burden on a fundamental interest. Maher, 432 U.S. at
474.
26i
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When law, ethical commentary, and the reports of official or
professional advisory bodies are consulted, there is a wide
consensus that the preembryo has a special moral status but
not a status equivalent to that of a person. The U.S. Ethics
Advisory Board, for example, unanimously agreed in 1979
that 'the human preembryo is entitled to profound respect,
but this respect does not necessarily encompass the full legal
and moral rights attributed to a person.'
John A. Robertson, Legal and EthicalIssues Arising with
PreimplantationHuman Embryos, 116
oGY & LABORATORY MED. 430 (1992).

279

ARCHIVES OF PATHOL-

But some restrictions can be constitutional. "As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion has recognized, not every law which makes a right more difficult to
exercise is, ipsofacto, an infringement of that right." Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2818.

"Ald. at 2818.
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218Id. at
282

2820.

Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. I11.1990).

28.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
284Id.

As noted above, the term "fetus" in this discussion is used
loosely to encompass not only fetuses but also zygotes,
preembryos and embryos.
'Fertility interventions in many instances have a lower rate of
pregnancy than coitus. On one end of the spectrum is artificial insemination, which with respect to the likelihood of fertilization or successful implantation, is indistinguishable from
coitus. On the other end are technologies such as ZIFT and
embryo transfer, which subject the embryo to a high risk of
loss. See supra section I.
287
A. Brian Little, There's Many a Slip 'Twixt Implantationand
the Crib, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 241 (1988); Allen J. Wilcox
et al., Incidence ofEarly Loss ofPregnancy, 319 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 189 (1988).
288

See Hill, supra note 43 (Vatican considers artificial insemination and extracorporeal fertilization "morally illicit").
289Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (moral sentiments against homosexuality are a rational basis for anti-sodomy laws).
2

government, in U.S. Dep't. ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973), abandoned its argument of morality as a state
interest as a result of the district court's conclusion that "'interpreting the amendment as an attempt to regulate morality
would raise serious constitutional questions.' Indeed, citing
this Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, Stanley v.
Georgia, and Eisenstadt v. Baird, the district court observed
that it was doubtful at best, whether Congress, 'in the name
of morality,' could 'infringe the rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home."' Id. at 536 n.7 (citations
omitted).
291George Huggins & Anne Wentz, Obstetrics and Gynecology,
265 JAMA 3139,3140 (1991) (no evidence of increased chromosomal or congenital abnormalities).
9 See, e.g., Report of National Institute of Child Health and
HumanDevelopment Workshop on ChorionicVillus Sampling
and Limb and Other Defects, 169 AM. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 1(1992).

19The

1 Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160 (App. Ct. Ill.). Accord In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990).
24
"Throughout this opinion we have stressed that the patient's
wishes, once they are ascertained, must be followed in 'virtually all cases' unless there are 'truly extraordinary or compelling reasons to override them.' Indeed, some may doubt
that there could ever be a situation extraordinary or compelling enough to justify a massive intrusion into a person's body,
such as a cesarean section, against that person's will." In re
A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
295Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d
457 (Ga. 1981).
2
961d. at 460 (Hill, J., concurring); id. at 461 (Smith, J., concurring).
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297See CAL. PENAL CODE
2

9 See

§ 270 (West 1994).

CAL. PENAL CODE § 187

(WEST 1988); 720 ILL. COMP.

STAT.

Ann. § 5/9.1-9.3 (West 1980); IOWA CODEANN. § 707.7 (WEST
1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 585:13 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 713 (West
1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.32.060 (WEST 1988); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 940.04
(WEST 1982).
299 See, e.g., Johnson v. Florida, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (no
drug delivery; rule of lenity); Kentucky v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d
280 (Ky. 1993) (no child abuse; legislative intent); Ohio v.
Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1991) (no child endangerment;
legislative intent); Collins v. Texas, 890 S.W.2d 893 (Ct.App.
Tex. 1994) (no reckless injury to child; inadequate notice in
law); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. Ga. 1992) (no
drug delivery; plain meaning of statute and rule of lenity);
Michigan v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. Mich. 1991)
(no drug delivery; legislative intent). But see Whitner v. State
of South Carolina, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120 (S.C. 1996) (Scope
of child abuse and endangerment statute includes viable fetuses.)
o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) & cmt. a (1989);
PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRrs § 55 at 368 (5th ed.

1984).
303Parental immunity is disapproved in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 895G(t) (1989) ("A parent or child is not immune
from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship."). A "substantial minority of jurisdictions" follow
this rule, and the abrogation of parental immunity is "a clear
and accelerating trend." Id. cmt. j.
3
°Compare Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (I11.1988)
(no cause of action against mother for prenatal torts against
fetus) with Bonte v. Bonte, 616A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992) (cause
of action exists against mother to same extent it does against
third parties) andGrodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Ct.App.
Mich. 1980) (same).
33

o Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.

34Id.

The importance of the state interest in the fetus may also vary
with other factors, such as the degree of certainty with which
injury may occur. For example, if assisted reproductive technologies were to guarantee the birth of physically impaired
children, the interest might be considered more compelling.
Small risks of fetal injury that could lead to deformities at
birth have been determined not to outweigh the right to procreate. In Lifchez v. Hartman, 735 F Supp. 1361, 1376-77
(N.D. I11.1990), the "high risk" to the fetus from embryo
transfer was not sufficient to outweigh the right to procreate
using this means. Of course, the primary nature of the risk
with embryo transfer is non-viability of the fetus, see supra
section IV.A. 1., not an injury that will be imposed upon a live
birth. However, chorionic villus sampling, which involves
"snip[ping] off some of [the fetus' surrounding tissue" and
which may be related to limb deformities in a small number
of cases, Report, supra note 292, was also protected by the
Lifchez court, even if the parents were not determined to abort
the fetus.
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Similarly, states that only have partially abrogated parental
immunity recognize the degree and nature of the risk to which
a parent subjects his or her child is determinative of availability of the immunity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
895G & cmt. e (1989) ("The exception is applied equally to
conduct that is not intended to cause bodily harm but proceeds in conscious and deliberate disregard of a high degree
of risk of it and is called by the courts 'willful,' 'wanton' or
,reckless' misconduct.").
This argument is taken even further by Suzanne Sangre, Control of Childbearing by HIV-Positive Women: Some Responses
to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 309, 404-06
(1993). She asserts there is no state interest at all in preventing the birth of injured children in the context of vertical HIV
transmission from mother to child. Comparing restraints on
childbirth by HIV+ women to execution of sick children, id.
at 405, she states that restraints on such "pregnancies cannot
be said to fulfill the state interest in protecting fetal life because such statutes promote fetal destruction or prevent the
possibility that a fetus will come to life at all," id. at 406.
- See supra section IV.A.
7

0 See supra section IV.C.2.b.
oMargery W. Shaw, ConditionalProspectiveRights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 93-94 (1984).
3
"See Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
3

3

special relationship between doctor and mother); Bergstreser
v. Mitchell, 577 F2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (construing Missouri
law); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Lab., 483 F.2d 237 (10th
Cir. 1973) (strict products liability) (construing Oklahoma
law); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Ct. App. Mich.
1989). It is important to note that jurisdictions that have recognized pre-conception torts have not applied them against
parents, nor is there liability to third parties for pre-conception torts when there is no live birth. These distinctions distinguish the policy reasons that pre-conception torts may be
recognized from the state interest in regulating use of reproductive technologies by the parents themselves, who have
not been found liable for pre-conception torts.
114 International Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 204
(1991).
31 See supra section IV.A.2.
316
3 17

Cf.Roe 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

See supra section II.

3, "The

majority of jurisdictions considering the question have
refused to recognize wrongful life claims. See generally 83
A.L.R.3d 15." Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 235, 240
(Ct. App. Mich. 1987).
319This should be distinguished from "wrongful birth" claims,
which are nearly uniformly recognized. Id. at 236.
The term 'wrongful birth' is a shorthand name given to actions brought by the parents of a child bom with severe defects against a physician (or other responsible party) who negligently fails to inform them in a timely fashion of the risk
that the mother will give birth to such a child, effectively
precluding an informed decision as to whether the pregnancy
should be avoided or terminated. A 'wrongful life' claim, on
the other hand, is brought on behalf of a child with birth defects who claims that, but for the negligent advice to the parents, the child would not have been born.

"An additional problem would be how to define a "defective

gene." With the progression of genetic research and gene
mapping, more and more diseases have been associated with
a genetic basis. Individuals with breast cancer or heart disease may be able to partly blame genetics, but for the state to
intervene in choices regarding whether such individuals
should exist illustrates the slippery slope associated with a
state interest in eliminating genetic defects.
31 But cf. laws against incest and consanguineous marriages,
which have often been justified on grounds of adverse genetic outcome of offspring. Such laws, however, are different
than prohibiting a particular genetic carrier from procreating,
either naturally or artificially, because they does not place an
absolute bar on an individual. And because of their limited
scope (in comparison to the size of the group of potential
mates) and uniform application, they may not even rise to the
level of a burden on a fundamental interest.
3'2 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
313Compare Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103,

1122 (1991) ("Only a very small number of courts have permitted recovery for injuries sustained as a result of preconception conduct."); Enright v. Eli Lily & Co., 570 N.E.2d
198 (N.Y. 1991 ) (no duty); Catherwood v. American Sterilizer, 498 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1986) (no duty to protect the potentiality of life); Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786
(N.Y. 1981) (no duty); McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258
(Ga. 1983) (no duty to unconceived where injuries are too
remote); with Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, 866 S.W.2d
851, 853 (Mo. 1993).
("Most jurisdictions that have addressed the question have
permitted preconception tort actions."); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (I11.1977) (duty arises out of
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Id. at 235.
v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).

320Becker
32

Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).

322

Proffitt, 412 N.W.2d at 240.

3

Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (N.H. 1986).

324

Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
v. Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).

32 Harbeson
326

Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982). An earlier California decision went so far as to suggest that parents would
be liable for deciding to procreate when it was known that a
child would be born with a physical impairment. "If a case
arose where, despite due care by the medical profession in
transmitting the necessary warnings, parents made a conscious
choice to proceed with a pregnancy, with full knowledge that
a seriously impaired infant would be bom ... we see no sound
public policy which should protect those parents from being
answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they have
wrought upon their offspring." Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs,
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829 (1980). This cause of action against
the parents was later abolished by the California legislature.
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CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.6.
Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988).

327
32

Id. at 1211.

1

39

""Missouri relies on its interest in the protection and preservation of human life, and there can be no gainsaying this interest. As a general matter, the States-indeed, all civilized nations-demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of States in
this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one
who assists another to commit suicide.... Finally, we think a
State may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply
assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life...." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 280, 282 (1990).
Suggested classifications based on family outcome include
marital status, marital stability, wealth, psychiatric history,
drug use and the like.These issues may raise traditional equal
protection issues, most of which require a rational basis for
legislation, see supra section IV.C. I., as well as heightened
scrutiny under analysis set forth in supra sections IV.A. &
C.2.
Alexander Capron argues that wealth and social status should
be decisive in reproductive technology access. He says that a
"goal of public policy in this field should be to protect the
social and financial well-being of the children produced. To
achieve this, explicit rules may be needed concerning the financial and other obligations of those who use the new techniques." Capron, supra note 17, at 693-94.

This position finds general support from Bartha Knoppers
and Sonia LeBris: "[Aissisted conception raises questions of
public order and good morals. For these reasons, few countries would guarantee universal accessibility. Most countries
impose special restrictions based on civil status, or on certain
medical criteria, with the aim of protecting the best interests
of the child." Bartha Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and
Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 346 (1991) (citing, in
part, n.55)
3
aPalmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
32

Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp 264 (E.D. La. 1972).
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Penn.
1988).
33'Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's
Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).

3

"See supra section IV.A.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173
(1972).
33
'Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852,854-55 & n.5 (1986) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)).
39 Bowen v. Flaherty, 483 U.S. 587, 600-01 (1987) (quoting
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78 (1911)).
3
1 See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S.
528, 534 (1973).
341"That some families may decide to modify their living arrangements in order to avoid the effect of the amendment, does not
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